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Executive Summary 
 
 The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) or (T) experienced a series of 
high-profile mainline derailments and other rail related occurrences in recent years.  These 
incidents resulted in numerous injuries, millions of dollars in equipment damage and repair costs, 
significant delays, unpredictable service, and increased dissatisfaction amongst regional 
stakeholders and customers regarding the organization’s ability to provide safe and reliable 
service.  In response, the MBTA Fiscal and Management Control Board (FMCB) convened a 
safety review panel (SRP) or (Panel) of external transportation industry experts to take a 
comprehensive review of the T’s safety performance, safety leadership, and culture.   The SRP’s 
mission is to undertake a comprehensive, independent analysis of rail safety at the MBTA.  This 
analysis includes a review of incidents over the past few years, as well as a broad analysis of the 
safety culture, policies, procedures, and practices at the MBTA.  The SRP also compared the 
MBTA’s practices to national and international best practices.  
 
 The SRP convened on June 27, 2019 and is comprised of Ray LaHood, a former United 
States (U.S.) Secretary of Transportation; Carolyn Flowers, a former Acting Federal Transit 
Administration (FTA) Administrator and Carmen Bianco, a former New York City Transit 
(NYCT) President (See Appendix “A” for biographies).   
 
 The Panel adopted the FTA’s Safety Management System (SMS) as a framework for 
conducting its work.  All mass transit properties throughout the U.S. must have a certified SMS in 
place by July 20, 2020 (See Appendix “B” for a brief description of the four components of SMS).  
Therefore, it was prudent to conduct this review within the framework of that new regulation.  In 
essence,  
 
“SMS means a formal, top down, organization-wide approach to managing 
 safety risk and assuring the effectiveness of the agency’s safety risk mitigation.  
 SMS includes systematic procedures, practices and policies for managing risks and 
hazards.”1 
 
 This Panel also evaluated the T’s current safety culture and its leadership’s approach to 
safety because an organization’s ability to perform or conduct its business effectively is a product 
of its leadership and culture. 
 
 To complete this analysis: the SRP conducted over 100 collaborative discussions with 
FMCB members, senior staff, mid-level management, supervision, frontline employees, union 
leadership and representatives from FTA, Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Public Utilities (DPU), Keolis-the MBTA commuter agency contractor, LTK, HNTB, STV, CRRC 
and Network Rail to ensure a comprehensive effort was undertaken that takes advantage of the 
expertise that resides both within the agency and partner organizations; facilitated six (6) focus 
groups consisting of diverse groups of agency employees; and reviewed numerous MBTA policies, 
procedures, job descriptions and accident reports.  Additionally, the Panel conducted site visits to                                                         1 Federal Register, Department of Transportation, Federal Transit Administration 49 CFR Part 673, Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan, National Public Transportation Safety Plan; Availability; Proposed Rule and Notice, Section 673.5 Definitions. 
  
the Operations Control Center (OCC), St. Mary’s Station derailment site, Green line slow speed 
areas, Green Line Extension project (GLX) construction sites, rail vehicles maintenance facilities, 
i.e. Southampton Service and Inspection (S&I) Facility, Boston Engine Terminal, Cabot, 
Wellington, Orient Heights, Reservoir, Lake Street,  Readville, Riverside, Mattapan, and Everett 
and participated in a live on-site derailment investigation at Reservoir Yard.   Several Panel 
members also attended Right of Way (ROW) and Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) training.  
The Panel conducted head-car ride observations on portions of the commuter rail and mass transit 
systems.  Lastly, the SRP requested that independent subject matter experts (SMEs) perform a 
detailed evaluation of the track maintenance and vehicle maintenance functions to ensure they are 
performing as intended. 
 
 Throughout the assessment phase, the Panel discovered that there are numerous factors that 
impact the T’s safety protocols and its safety culture.  The following narrative highlights many of 
the significant observations made by the SRP and their correlation to the SMS framework.  
 
 While the agency performs the necessary core functions to be considered a relatively safe 
system, many aspects of the T’s approach to safety and operations need immediate attention.  The 
Panel did identify omissions in the required Preventative Maintenance and Inspections’ (PMIs) 
schedule and Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC) concerns that offer an explanation for 
many of the service disruptions that the MBTA is experiencing.  
 
 Critical PMIs are not taking place as required.  This creates a serious issue that requires 
immediate attention and this information has already been shared with MBTA leadership.  Over 
the years, due to shortage of and/or inexperienced leadership, competing priorities and fiscal 
controls, operational managers have had difficulty identifying what maintenance and inspections 
need to be done, or have been dropped due to fiscal pressures or lack of staffing.  Furthermore, 
there is little, or in many cases, no data to support what maintenance and inspections are required, 
or what has been accomplished.  In other instances, procedures are well documented and available, 
but are not enforced by local supervision.  It also does not appear that sufficient condition 
assessments have been conducted on many system assets that may drive a higher level of 
preventive maintenance actions.  This will require leadership’s urgent attention to identify what 
inspections and maintenance must take place, at what intervals, and establish performance 
indicators that show progress against stated goals.  
 
 Another component of sound safety management and a requirement of SMS is a QA/QC 
function that measures and provides oversight of maintenance practices, engineering designs and 
implementation at the field level.  This function monitors the quality of the work being performed, 
and has independent individuals who conduct their work and brief leadership on their findings and 
recommendations.  There is no meaningful QA/QC strategy or system in place at this point in time.  
This is another critical function that leadership must implement to establish a sound safety culture. 
 
 In general, the SRP found that the T’s approach to safety is questionable, which results in 
safety culture concerns. In almost every area we examined, deficiencies in policies, application of 
safety standards or industry best practices, and accountability were apparent.  The foundation for 
safety is also not obvious as the agency has not identified or adopted a comprehensive vision, 
mission, values or set of strategies and goals to guide the agency’s actions to achieve a safe work 
  
environment and to deliver quality service.  Without such strategy being implemented and 
embraced by executive leadership, it becomes substantially more difficult for the agency to achieve 
the level of performance required to run a safe transit system. 
 
 It is noteworthy to mention that the commuter rail service is performing well and does not 
face many of the challenges that were identified on the transit side of the house.  The Panel 
attributes this higher level of performance to the structure provided by FRA regulations, which are 
clearly defined and have fiscal consequences if not complied with.  The one area that needs 
immediate attention is their fatigue management program, which does not contain an effective 
Obstructive Sleep Apnea (OSA) screening program; however, their management is diligently 
pursuing this goal.  Conversely, the MBTA transit rail operation does have a mature fatigue 
program in place. 
 
 Leadership sets the tone for safety. Starting at the executive leadership level, the recurrent 
turnover in general managers (GMs) over the past 10 years has been incredibly disruptive and has 
placed the agency in a vulnerable position.  This may be the overarching reason that we see the 
level of safety deficiency at the agency.  Since 2010, there have been nine new (9) general 
managers.  The incumbent GM has only been in the position since January 2019.   It is obvious 
that many new executives have been hired in recent years as the T attempts to position the agency 
to meet an aggressive capital initiative and the overall transformation of the agency.  While it is 
excellent to build this team, little if any time has been invested to help them onboard, assimilate 
into the agency’s mission, or to understand the agency’s safety practices.   
 
 Also obvious is that the mandate requiring the FMCB to have such frequent meetings has 
had a detrimental effect on the organization.  By legislation, this Board is required to meet in 
session 36 times a year.  Staff preparation to meet the needs of the Board is overwhelming and 
leaves staff little if any time to tend to the operation or the maintenance of the system.  It’s 
unquestionable that this mandate is causing staff to “take their eye off the ball” and contributes to 
safety not getting the time and attention it requires.  
  
 Our staff interviews and work in the field revealed that leadership feels somewhat defeated, 
helpless and in some cases hopeless.  There is a general feeling that fiscal controls over the years 
may have gone too far, which coupled with staff cutting has resulted in the inability to accomplish 
required maintenance and inspections, or has hampered work keeping legacy system assets fully 
functional.  Staff repeatedly shared their frustration with the cost-cutting process and the inability 
to acquire new positions as needed to accomplish the task at hand.  It is our understanding that in 
recent months, leadership has instituted new standards for the approval of staff positions that will 
provide a quicker turnaround.   
 
 Today, change at the T is occurring at an exciting and accelerated pace due to the leadership 
and support provided by the governor and the FMCB.   The desire to invest in the infrastructure 
and operation, the expansion of new services and hiring of many new employees has resulted in 
sweeping changes.  However, there is no question, current leadership is struggling to understand 
how they will deliver the accelerated Capital Program, keep legacy system assets fully functional, 
in addition to carrying out normal day-to-day PMIs, given the current state of the Authority.   
 
  
 The FMCB developed a strategic plan to set the direction, initiatives, and programs to drive 
the outcomes and inform the decision-making process of the agency.  However, the cultural 
environment at MBTA is narrowly focused on values, attitudes and behaviors, which are centered 
around the delivery of the capital plan.  Although the plan stipulates that safety is a priority, the 
reality is that on a tactical level, the priorities and resources of the agency have been dedicated to 
capital acceleration.  The FMCB has put a significant focus on fiscal control of operating expenses, 
while at the same time increasing the throughput of the capital program.  The outcome of this 
emphasis on capital delivery has been detrimental to Operations.  The result is sharing of critical 
operational resources and stretching those resources to serve multiple functions.  For example, the 
maintenance crews are being flexed between daily operational support requirements and the 
accelerated capital program.  This has had an adverse impact on the ability to support system 
maintenance repairs and safe delivery of services.   
 
 The strategic plan is crucial to provide guidance and direct decision making at the agency. 
Goals and objectives for the agency were developed to respond to the financial and capital delivery 
crises.   But the strategic plan, as well as, the annual financial plan lacks a critical element — there 
is an absence of measures or metrics for monitoring, evaluating, and analyzing outcomes of the 
Board’s priorities. This is particularly evident in the monthly safety reports which basically 
provide a trend line but no target comparisons.  There are also no metrics for key operational 
indicators, such as PMIs that contribute to the safety of the system.  Asset management and life 
cycle maintenance are key to keeping the system fully functioning but MBTA is not monitoring 
the performance of their maintenance programs.   
 
 The Safety Department plays a critical role in establishing a successful SMS program. 
Currently, from a safety perspective, leadership across the agency is not connected to any identified 
safety values or goals, at any level, including the GM, Deputy GM or senior operating staff.  The 
safety department, which should be providing day-to day leadership for safety initiatives, is 
somewhat debilitated in what they can accomplish, and lacks the ability to guide the agency at 
large.  For example, the staff is absent in the field to support the workforce and champion a safe 
work environment. On the other hand, the safety department is grossly understaffed, lacks subject 
matter experts (SMEs) and is currently not in any position to manage the needs of the agency.  It 
is also important to note that the head of the safety department is new and started in that position 
in January 2019.  
 
 The Panel also found that a current culture of blame and retaliation impede the T’s ability 
to achieve a greater level of risk management and safety assurance.  Perceived or real, employees 
in general do not trust their leadership and therefore, do not share with leadership what is 
happening in the field for fear of heavy-handed discipline.  The workforce does not feel supported 
by management and are clearly frustrated with the management’s lack of responsiveness to their 
needs. We heard countless situations where employees’ requests for needed safety equipment or 
support went unanswered.  During this review, we also heard and gained first-hand knowledge of 
circumstances where employees, who reported safety issues on numerous occasions eventually 
lost faith in management’s ability to care about getting anything done.  As a result,  it is likely that 
many safety issues today go unreported.   
 
  
 The lack of upward and downward communication within the agency is also at the core of 
many of the T’s safety issues.  As mentioned earlier, employees lack trust in their leadership or 
fear retribution so they generally refrain from reporting issues or identifying themselves in any 
reports.  But even beyond this issue, there is a total lack of routine upward or downward 
communication within the agency.  Employees at all levels told the Panel that the T has many 
siloes and that communication is rarely, if ever, done across departments.  Leadership has not 
identified or attempted to open channels of communication with the workforce.  An overwhelming 
number of employees are not able to receive electronic communications and have minimal 
alternatives to communicate with agency leaders, nor do leaders have a way to communicate with 
the workforce.  The only avenue for communication we identified during this review is a “safety 
hotline” which does not appear to have received the confidence of the workforce in the field.  It 
should be noted that the Panel met staff in support functions, such as internal communications and 
human resources, who have the skills and abilities to implement new strategies that will improve 
communications to build trust among all levels of employees. 
 
 In essence, safety is not the priority at the T, but it must be.  To meet the demands of the 
future, the agency must address its safety culture – it is critical to every aspect of the agency.    The 
GM must make safety his number one priority and realize there is nothing more important to the 
T’s customers and employees than safety. This should also be the number one priority in quality 
maintenance and inspections, employee training and communication, staff onboarding, values, 
goals and strategy. The GM must clearly identify every leader’s role in making safety the number 
one agency priority.  It is critical that every department and leader within the agency is clear on 
his or her safety responsibilities.  Not only should such responsibilities be a detailed part of every 
employee’s job description, but all employees should receive ongoing feedback to create 
accountability. Having safety as a core value will drive strategy and decision making in the future.        
 
 The SRP is providing 34 recommendations, which contain 61 individual corrective 
actions that the Panel believes will set the agency on the path toward implementing a more 
effective SMS approach to safety and decrease the frequency and severity of organizational 
accidents. 
 
In conclusion, the SRP wants to acknowledge and thank the members of the FMCB and 
especially the Chair, who provided exemplary leadership and unlimited support to make this 
review achieve its stated mission.  We would also like to thank the staff, employees and numerous 
labor leaders, who have helped us gather the information found in this report, as well as the FTA, 
FRA, DPU, Keolis, LTK, HNTB, STV, CRRC and Network Rail for their input and collaboration 
throughout the process.   
 
 The Panel wishes the T great success in the future and hopes this report helps achieve safety 
success and full compliance with SMS.   
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I. ACRONYMS 
 
AFC   Automated Fare Collection 
BTS   Bureau of Transportation Statistics  
C3RS   Confidential Close Call Reporting System 
CAP   Corrective Action Plan 
CIP   Capital Improvement Plan 
CIPSEA  Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act 
DPU   Department of Public Utilities 
FMCB   Fiscal Management and Control Board 
FRA   Federal Railroad Administration 
FRMP   Fatigue Risk Management Program 
FTA   Federal Transit Administration 
GLX   Green Line Extension Project 
GM   General Manager 
GPS   Global Positioning System 
KPI   Key Performance Indicator 
LIDAR  Light Detection and Ranging Technology 
MASSDOT  Massachusetts Department of Transportation 
M&E   Mechanical & Engineering 
MBTA (or T)  Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority 
MOW   Maintenance of Way 
NASA   National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NYCT   New York City Transit 
NTSB   National Transportation Safety Board  
OCC   Operations Control Center 
OSA   Obstructive Sleep Apnea 
POD   Point of Derailment 
PPE   Personal Protective Equipment 
PTASP  Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan 
QA   Quality Assurance 
QC   Quality Control 
ROW   Right of Way 
RTA   Rail Transit Agency 
RWP   Roadway Worker Protection 
SME    Subject Matter Expert 
SMRC   Safety Management Executive Review Committee 
SMS   Safety Management System 
SOGR   State of Good Repair 
SRCP   Safety Rules Compliance Program 
SRP (or Panel) Safety Review Panel 
SSOA   State Safety Oversight Agency 
TAM   Transit Asset Management  
U.S.   United States 
WMATA  Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 
ZBB   Zero Based Budgeting 
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II. BACKGROUND 
 
The FMCB was established by Governor Charles Baker and the Legislature in July 2015 
to oversee and improve the finances, management, and operations at the MBTA.  In the spring of 
2016, the FMCB initiated a strategic planning process to clearly articulate priority initiatives to 
reinvent the MBTA as a 21st century organization.  If executed well, the plan is intended to ensure 
that there is never again a deterioration of the public transit system, and instead, that they are 
supported and held accountable to continuously improve the vital service that the T provides.2 
 
In recent years, the MBTA has experienced a series of high-profile mainline derailments 
and other rail related operational incidents.  These events resulted in numerous injuries, millions 
of dollars in equipment damage and repair costs, significant delays, unpredictable service and 
increased dissatisfaction amongst regional stakeholders and customers regarding the 
organization’s ability to provide safe and reliable service.    
In response to these events, and aligned with the continuous improvement aspect of the 
strategic plan, the FMCB convened a SRP of external transportation industry experts to perform a 
detailed review of the T’s safety performance, safety leadership, and culture. The mission of the 
SRP is to undertake a comprehensive, independent analysis of rail safety at the MBTA.  This 
analysis includes a review of incidents over the past few years, as well as a broad analysis of the 
safety culture, policies, procedures, and practices.  In addition, the SRP conducted a comparison 
of the T to national and international best practices. 
 
To complete this analysis: the SRP conducted over 100 collaborative discussions (see 
Appendix C for “List of Interviewees”) with FMCB members, senior staff, mid-level management, 
supervision, frontline employees, union leadership and representatives from FTA, FRA, DPU, 
Keolis-the MBTA commuter agency contractor, LTK, HNTB, STV, CRRC and Network Rail to 
ensure a comprehensive effort was undertaken that takes advantage of the expertise that resides 
both within the agency and partner organizations; facilitated six (6) focus groups consisting of 
diverse groups of agency employees; and reviewed numerous MBTA policies, procedures, job 
descriptions and accident reports.   
 
Additionally, the Panel conducted site visits to the OCC, St. Mary’s Station derailment site, 
Green line slow speed areas, GLX construction sites, rail vehicles maintenance facilities, i.e. 
Southampton S&I Facility, Boston Engine Terminal, Cabot, Wellington, Orient Heights, 
Reservoir, Lake Street,  Readville, Riverside, Mattapan, and Everett and participated in a live on-
site derailment investigation at Reservoir Yard.   Several Panel members also attended ROW and 
RWP trainings.  The Panel conducted head-car ride observations on portions of the commuter rail 
and mass transit systems.  Lastly, the SRP requested that independent SMEs perform a detailed 
evaluation of the track maintenance and vehicle maintenance functions to ensure they are 
performing as intended.                                                            
2 MBTA Fiscal and Management Control Board, Strategic Plan, April 2017. 
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III. INTRODUCTION  
The Panel adopted SMS as the framework for conducting its work, as all mass transit 
properties throughout the U.S. must have a certified written SMS policy in place by July 20, 2020. 
In essence: 
 
“SMS means a formal, top down, organization-wide approach to managing 
 safety risk and assuring the effectiveness of the agency’s safety risk mitigation.  
 SMS includes systematic procedures, practices and policies for managing risks and 
hazards.” 
 
FTA’s adoption of the SMS framework elevated the approach to safety in public transit, 
shifting the industry from a reactive one to a more proactive stance with greater focus on the 
prevention of events. SMS is intended to bring management and labor together to build a safety 
culture in transit dedicated to controlling and reducing risk, detecting and correcting safety issues 
in their early stages.  The SMS framework is comprised of four (4) key components; Safety Policy, 
Safety Risk Management, Safety Assurance and Safety Promotion. 
 
Figure 1: The Four SMS Components 
 
 
 
For the clarity of the reader, the report will be making distinctions between the MBTA’s 
commuter rail operation and their transit rail operation.  The day-to-day commuter rail operation 
is outsourced to Keolis and falls under FRA oversight.  Their management interfaces with key 
MBTA personnel, who oversee Keolis’ contractual obligations.  The transit side of the house is 
solely managed by MBTA personnel and falls under DPU oversight, which is the MBTA’s State 
Safety Oversight Agency (SSOA).  The DPU is subordinate to the FTA. 
 
In general, the SRP found that the T’s approach to safety is questionable, which results in 
safety culture concerns. In almost every area we examined, deficiencies in policies, application of 
safety standards or industry best practices, and accountability were apparent.  The foundation for 
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safety is also not obvious as the agency has not identified or adopted a comprehensive vision, 
mission, values or set of strategies and goals to guide the organization’s actions to achieve a safe 
work environment and deliver quality service.  Without that being in place and embraced by 
executive leadership, it becomes substantially more difficult for the agency to achieve the expected 
level of performance that is required to run a safe transit system. 
 
Throughout the assessment phase, the Panel discovered that there are numerous factors that 
impact the T’s safety protocols and its safety culture. These are clear signs that the current SMS 
and the agency’s overall approach to safety is not functioning properly.  In essence, safety is not 
the priority at the T, but it must be. To meet the demands of the future, the agency must address 
its safety culture – it is critical to every aspect of the agency. The GM must make safety his number 
one priority and realize there is nothing more important to the T’s customers and employees than 
safety. This should also be the number one priority in quality maintenance and inspections, 
employee training and communication, staff onboarding, values, goals and strategy. The GM must 
clearly identify every leader’s role in making safety the number one agency priority.  It is critical 
that every department and leader within the agency is clear on his or her safety responsibilities.  
Not only should such responsibilities be a detailed part of every employee’s job description, but 
all employees should receive ongoing feedback to create accountability. Having safety as a core 
value will drive strategy and decision making in the future. The following narrative highlights 
many of the key observations made by the SRP and their correlation to the SMS framework.  
 
IV. SAFETY POLICY 
 
Safety Objectives and Performance Targets 
 
As part of the Safety Policy component of SMS, transit agencies must establish its 
organizational accountabilities and responsibilities and a have a written statement of safety 
management policy that includes the agency’s safety objectives and safety performance targets.3  
Therefore, a significant factor in a successful SMS is sharing and analyzing safety data to help 
establish these metrics. Once established, they must be formally communicated throughout the 
agency (as appropriate), reviewed to measure the effectiveness of risk mitigations and periodically 
updated to ensure the organization is achieving the intended outcomes. Furthermore, data analysis 
aids senior leadership in making risk-informed decisions to more effectively prioritize 
organizational actions and the allocation of resources, as well as developing and implementing 
corrective action plans (CAPs) to address safety concerns.  
 
There is a serious challenge within the agency related to collecting and analyzing data.  
This leads to inadequate data to develop, implement, measure and monitor progress towards 
strategic objectives.  In discussions with MBTA staff, the organization appears to be in the process                                                         
3There are 3 key terms for establishing performance measurement criteria: 
Safety Objective - A high level, global, generic and non-quantifiable statement regarding conceptual safety 
achievements to be accomplished by an organization regarding its safety performance. 
Safety Performance Target – A specific level of performance for a given performance measure over a specified 
timeframe related to safety management activities. 
Safety Performance Indicator – A data-driven, quantifiable parameter used for monitoring and assessing safety 
performance.  
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of implementing electronic means of tracking critical records; however, this effort shows great 
variation depending upon which department is engaged in the conversation.  The Vehicle 
department appears to be the most advanced in this effort, while many of the Maintenance of Way 
(MOW) departments, i.e. Track, Signals, Power, are in their infancy. 
 
The SRP found little evidence of the MBTA’s mass transit operation establishing safety 
objectives, safety performance targets or safety performance indicators. Very few measures have 
been established to monitor safety as well as other key operational indicators.  The monthly Safety 
reports have only one metric, “zero derailments”.  There are no targets or key performance 
indicators for other operational incidents such as collisions, fires, employee lost time injury rates 
and preventative maintenance, as some examples.  The agency does not use performance 
monitoring tools such as dashboards, balanced scorecard, strategy maps or industry benchmarking 
to set targets or track performance.  Most of the reports can be characterized as record keeping, 
providing month to month trends with no analysis and causes for variance in the data reported. 
 
The Panel identified that a select portion of PMIs activities were intentionally no longer 
being performed on the transit side of the agency, which agency personnel attributed to human 
resource and track access challenges.  It should be noted that the MBTA’s lack of hiring and 
succession planning has compounded the problem. As a result of these constraints, managers at 
the departmental level are placed in the untenable position of self-selecting what critical aspects 
of their PMI regimes will be performed and what PMIs will be deferred. This circumstance was 
elevated to senior managers; however, it was not sufficiently acted upon. The GM and FMCB 
appeared to be blind to this organizational risk until they were alerted to it by the SRP.   
 
Essentially, deferred maintenance has been institutionalized in some areas of the 
organization.  Without established safety performance targets and indicators in place, there is no 
mechanism to alert executive leadership of this shortcoming. Nor were these deficiencies flagged 
by the Safety department during Safety Assurance activities, which will be discussed later in the 
report. 
 
In addition, there is little, or in many cases, no data to support what maintenance and 
inspections are required, or what has been accomplished.  In other instances, procedures are well 
documented and available, but are not enforced by local supervision. Nor does it appear that 
sufficient condition assessments have been conducted on legacy system assets that may drive a 
higher level of preventive maintenance actions; the condition of the Orange Line vehicles is one 
example, which will be discussed further in the Safety Risk Management section of this report. In 
response to these findings, transit management is having a consultant evaluate PMI and QA/QC 
activities so that the agency can develop strategies to address this situation.  
 
It is noteworthy to mention that the commuter rail service operated by Keolis is performing 
well and does not face many of the challenges that were identified on the transit side of the house.  
The Panel attributes this higher level of performance to the structure provided by FRA regulations, 
which are clearly defined and have fiscal consequences, if not complied with.  The MBTA should 
seriously consider immediately adopting FRA regulations for the transit operation to provide clear 
direction to the workforce on minimum thresholds for operational safety activities. These 
thresholds can be modified once the agency is better organized and is running well. 
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Perhaps of greater significance, Keolis and MBTA management assigned to oversee the 
commuter rail contract, appear to be fully engaged in the daily operations of the organization, 
while the leadership on the mass transit side of the house, appears to be extremely distracted by 
preparing for frequent FMCB meetings. This dynamic is clearly affecting the operational and 
safety performance of the organization. 
 
Safety Reporting Systems 
 
SMS Safety Policy requires Rail Transit Agencies (RTAs) to establish a process that allows 
and provides protection to employees who report safety conditions, and provides a description of 
behaviors that may result in disciplinary action. Close call or safety reporting systems have proved 
to be an effective method for improving safety in the chemical, nuclear and transportation 
industries. A non-punitive, confidential close call reporting system typically uses a collaborative 
problem-solving methodology that encompasses all stakeholders. Success of such a program 
requires a focus on precursor events that may lead to accidents, the use of data and SMEs to 
determine corrective actions.   
 
The main avenue for employees to report safety issues, on the transit side of the house, is 
a “safety hotline,” which appears not to have the confidence of the workforce in the field.  There 
are other methods of reporting i.e. Good Faith Challenge forms, reporting safety concerns directly 
to supervision or to a Safety officer, etc.; however, these methods do not appear to be used in any 
meaningful way.   
 
Safety department representatives have made efforts to promote the safety hotline, and it 
has recently experienced an increase in the volume of calls being received. The SRP believes that 
greater reporting of safety concerns does not necessarily translate into an increase in safety issues.  
On the contrary, the SRP views increased reporting as a positive trend that can surface safety 
concerns and should be measured over time to see if it is sustained.  Further details of the MBTA’s 
employee reporting systems and the agency’s present culture of blame and retaliation will be 
discussed in the Safety Assurance section of this document.  
 
Communication 
 
Another requirement of SMS is for the safety management policy to be communicated 
throughout the agency.  The lack of communications is also at the core of many of the Ts safety 
issues.  As mentioned earlier, employees lack trust in their leadership or fear retribution so they 
generally refrain from reporting issues or identifying themselves in any reports.  But even beyond 
this issue is a total lack of routine upward or downward communication within the agency. 
Employees at all levels told the Panel that the T has many siloes and that communication is rarely, 
if ever, done across departments.   
 
Leadership hasn’t identified or attempted to open channels of communication with the 
workforce. An overwhelming number of employees are not able to receive electronic 
communications and have minimal alternatives to communicate with agency leaders, nor do 
leaders have a way to communicate with the workforce.  It should be noted that the Panel met 
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support staff, such as internal communications and human resources personnel, who have the skills 
and abilities to implement new strategies that will improve communications and begin to build 
trust among all levels of employees. These resources appear to be under-utilized at the present 
time.  The GM and Deputy GM have also started to engage field personnel to solicit their feedback 
on the safety challenges facing the organization. 
 
Accountable Executive 
 
SMS requires that the RTA identify an “Accountable Executive” to be accountable for 
ensuring that the agency’s SMS is effectively implemented.  This individual is typically the head 
of the organization, i.e. the GM in the case of the MBTA.  This individual is also responsible for 
addressing substandard SMS performance. The Accountable Executive may delegate specific 
responsibilities; however, he/she is ultimately accountable for the agency’s safety performance.   
 
Leadership sets the tone for safety, starting at the executive leadership level. The recurrent 
turnover in GMs over the past 10 years has been incredibly disruptive and has placed the agency 
in a vulnerable position.  This may be the overarching reason that we see the level of safety 
deficiency at the agency.  Since 2010, there have been nine (9) new GMs.  The incumbent GM has 
only been in the position since January 2019.  This individual does not possess in-depth 
transportation operations and safety knowledge, which are the core functions of the organization 
that he is tasked with managing.  Additionally, members of the existing leadership team have not 
achieved the results that the riding public expects of the T; therefore, these executive leaders should 
receive mentoring and coaching by seasoned transit industry professionals to improve their 
effectiveness.   
 
It is also obvious that many new executives have been hired in recent years, as the T 
attempts to position the agency to meet an aggressive capital initiative and the overall 
transformation of the agency.  While it is excellent to build this team, little if any time has been 
invested to help them onboard or assimilate them into the agency’s mission or understand its safety 
practices.  In addition, the senior leadership team should be augmented with seasoned transit 
professionals with operations and safety backgrounds, as previous employee reductions because 
of force incentives or “buy-outs” has created organizational brain drain in many areas.  
Metaphorically, the T does not have a deep bench of seasoned leadership in both the technical and 
support areas. 
 
The FMCB would also benefit from adding individuals with operations and safety skillsets 
to its ranks to provide a more holistic approach to overseeing the MBTA.  At current, the Board 
does not have anyone who has operational or safety experience or expertise.  Nor is the FMCB 
chartered in its mission as a Board to specifically monitor safety or safe operations; therefore, over 
its existence, the FMCB has done little to make safety a priority or to hold leadership accountable 
for safety performance.  The Boards of other transit agencies have done a much better job to 
identify members who possess these skill sets, i.e. a sitting FRA Chief Safety Officer and a retired 
Vice Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), as some examples.  The 
FMCB should consider a similar approach to ensure safety receives adequate attention. 
 
V. SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT 
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Hazard Mitigation 
 
Safety Risk Management requires the agency to develop processes for the identification, 
analysis and evaluation of potential consequences associated with safety hazards. Safety risk must 
also be evaluated in the terms of probability and severity, as well take into account existing 
mitigations already in place.  Once the evaluation is complete, the agency must develop and 
implement mitigations, i.e. CAPs. 
 
The CAPs being produced by MBTA transit management are not achieving the level of 
safety improvement needed at the organization.  Over a seventy-six-day period, there were three 
major incidents (June 8, 2019, Green Line Overspeed derailment, the June 11, 2019, Red Line 
broken axle derailment and the August 23, 2019, Orange Line track fire).  These events resulted 
in 13 injuries, and millions of dollars in damage, repair and labor costs.   
 
MBTA management provided the SRP with estimates of the costs associated with the Red 
Line derailment – this exceeded five million dollars. Based upon our professional experience, the 
SRP believes that this cost estimate is extremely under-representative of the true financial impact 
to the agency when considering all aspects of the event.  The recovery required the rehabilitation 
of the damaged signal room, the installation of approximately 20 miles of new signal cables and 
other signal equipment, the operational testing of new signal relays and operational field testing of 
signal circuits.  There was also track and rail vehicle damage, as well as the costs associated with 
consultant analysis fees, the labor associated with the fleet-wide ultrasound testing of axles and 
the inspection of ground brush assemblies.  There are other costs, such as a loss of customer 
revenue, that did not appear in the cost estimates.  
 
This incident also initially required a bus bridge operation, which was closely followed by 
a manual block operation to provide train service.  The manual block required the support of 50 
employees a day for approximately 106 days.  Of much greater significance than fiscal 
implications associated with these activities is that this single event exposed the agency to a 
tremendous amount of organizational risk. A complex manual train operation performed without 
the protection provided by a functioning signal system is very susceptible to human error. 
However, MBTA transit management ensured sufficient supervision and Safety personnel were 
present to oversee the daily operation, which was ultimately carried out safely. 
 
The Red Line and Orange Line incidents can be directly linked to systemic PMI 
deficiencies and lax QA/QC oversight.  These activities are fundamental tasks that all rail agencies 
perform; however, previous accident investigations did not surface these deficiencies.  As a result 
of ineffective investigations, the needed evaluation of the risk associated with these hazards was 
not performed.  Subsequently, the CAPs to combat these safety concerns were never created; 
therefore, the organization continues to experience repetitive operational incidents.  
 
Corrective Action Plans 
 
The Green Line is vulnerable to human performance errors resulting in operational 
incidents, which is primarily due to the limitations of its current signal system. The signal system 
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on the Green Line is scheduled to be upgraded, which will dramatically reduce human performance 
errors.  However, until that occurs, the MBTA has developed CAPs to address this circumstance. 
 
Presently, the MBTA transit management CAP process is as follows; once a hazard is 
identified, the DPU and MBTA’s transit management teams work collaboratively in the 
development, implementation and closure of CAPs.  As one example, in response to the June 8, 
2019, overspeed derailment at Kenmore Square, the MBTA implemented CAP 4624-4. This CAP 
pertains to MBTA staff performing Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) speed checks on the 
Green Line.  It states, “LIDAR testing will be conducted at a minimum of twice weekly and the 
results will be reviewed and analyzed at standing meetings to identify emerging trends.”  This is 
one of four actions that need to be completed to close the overall CAP.  The other corrective actions 
focus on improved training (Open), developing automation of Global Positioning System (GPS) 
tracking on Type 8 trolleys to identify and alert management of speed infractions (Open), and a 
pilot of a “Green Line Location Map” that enables OCC dispatchers to manually click on icons 
representing Green Line trains to determine their speed in real time (Closed).  
 
In June and July of 2019, more than 1,100 Safety Rules Compliance Program (SRCP) audit 
activities were conducted on the Green Line and in June, there was a 300% increase in the 
frequency of safety audits when compared to the previous month. These activities are 
commendable; however, it appears that transit Operations and Safety management are responding 
to lagging indicators, i.e. reacting to incidents that have already transpired.  In discussions with 
the Safety department, the SRP was informed that their personnel are predominantly present on 
the 8-4 tour and do not have a significant presence on other tours.  However, they do have 
personnel on-call to respond to events that occur during other tours.  Therefore, the Safety 
department is largely focused on responding to events, rather than the prevention of accidents.  In 
addition, proactive maintenance activities such as vegetation control had been suspended by 
Operation’s management.  This circumstance will be discussed in the more detail in the Safety 
Assurance section.  
 
In addition, CAP 4624-4 focuses solely on over-speeding on the Green line.  There does 
not appear to be an organization-wide strategy to perform these actions on other rail lines or to 
measure other types of non-conformance to rules beyond over-speeding. Nor is there a clearly 
articulated plan to perform operational tests or inspections beyond the title of “motor-person”.   
 
CAP 4624-4 was “opened” by the MBTA on July 9, 2019 and it was subsequently 
submitted to the DPU and approved to be “closed” approximately one month later on August 9, 
2019.  The rapid closure of this corrective action does not provide sufficient time for staff to 
monitor that these activities are being repetitively performed and to verify whether or not it is 
having the desired effect.  In addition, although the CAP states in part, “…the results (of LIDAR 
testing) will be reviewed and analyzed at standing meetings to identify emerging trends.” The SRP 
is not aware that there was a detailed analysis of the original 1,100 audits that were conducted. A 
detailed analysis of this data may drive further actions.  In addition, it is human nature for 
individuals to focus on open items and lose sight of “closed” actions. Therefore, the Panel is not 
confident that continued analysis and verification activities will be sufficiently conducted. 
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The above example is illustrative of the MBTA transit management’s current approach to 
safety: Following an incident, there is a feverish response to a very specific problem without 
developing and implementing a global strategy to address the hazard.  The corrective action is 
tracked for a brief duration and then closed.  The CAPs are not being effectively audited to evaluate 
whether the required actions are continuing to take place or if the corrective action is effective. As 
a result, no substantial corrective actions are institutionalized, which if nourished, could create 
permanent change.  Hence, the safety concerns and operational incidents persist. 
 
Conversely, on the commuter rail side, Keolis has clearly defined targets and upon request, 
their management was able to produce detailed data regarding the amount of operational testing 
and inspections4 that are being performed by the type of test, title of the person being monitored 
and the outcomes. It should be noted that the DPU has performed independent LIDAR checks to 
monitor over-speeding by motor-persons; however, the FRA appears to have a more robust 
program as their inspectors routinely perform observations of multiple areas, i.e. transportation, 
track, signals, RWP activities, etc. to gauge the organization’s performance. 
 
Of much greater significance, on the commuter rail side, there are mechanisms in place to 
identify and act upon non-conformance should it occur. FRA personnel reviewed the Keolis’ 
operational test and inspection data 5 and noted that some of the required activities were not 
meeting established agency goals. When this information was brought to senior Keolis and MBTA 
management’s attention, they jointly reviewed the situation and increased the number of “Route 
Line Manager” positions to bring operational testing and inspection levels back into conformance. 
This is a much more proactive approach to safety than is seen at MBTA’s transit operation. At 
Keolis, the FRA oversight personnel identified a potential hazard and contractor/agency personnel 
implemented risk mitigation strategies to address it before a significant event occurred. This 
circumstance presents a benchmarking opportunity for the MBTA’s transit management, i.e. they 
can compare best practices utilized on commuter rail and consider adopting the same approach, 
where it makes sense for their operation. 
 
The FRA regulatory requirement to conduct these tests and inspections gives Keolis and 
MBTA management, who oversee the contract, great leverage to seek and receive resources for 
these activities.  This leverage is not as apparent on the transit side of the house, as they are not 
subject to such defined regulations.  Nor has their management established targets for a broad 
range of operational tests and inspections, which could be used to make a business case for funding 
these activities.     
 
It should be noted, that MBTA transit management does have an excellent employee 
fatigue risk management program (FRMP); however, transit management should evaluate 
requiring contractors, who perform safety sensitive operations such as operating work equipment, 
to also comply with the T’s FRMP standards.  This is also one area where Keolis needs to improve,                                                         
4 49 CFR Part 217.9-Program of operational tests and inspections; “recordkeeping (a) Requirement to conduct 
operational tests and inspections.  Each railroad to which this part applies shall periodically conduct operational tests 
and inspections to determine the extent of compliance with its code of operating rules, timetables and timetable 
special instructions…” 
5 49 CFR Part 217.9 Program of operational tests and inspections; recordkeeping (d)(2) Each railroad shall retain 
one copy of its current program for periodic performance of the operational tests and inspections…These records 
shall be available to representatives of the FRA for inspection and copying during normal business hours. 
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as they currently lack an Obstructive Sleep Apnea (OSA) screening program. Implementing a 
program of this nature is a proactive measure that exceeds current FRA regulatory obligations and 
is another action that can further reduce human performance errors from occurring. Several 
commuter rail properties and transit agencies have voluntarily implemented programs of this 
nature and they can be used as a resource by Keolis for benchmarking.  Keolis and MBTA 
management is diligently working toward implementing an OSA screening program on commuter 
rail.   
 
Subject Matter Expert Inspections 
 
As stated earlier, the CAPs being produced by MBTA management are not achieving the 
level of safety improvement needed at the organization.  Some of the recent high-profile 
derailments on both the commuter rail and mass transit side of the MBTA operation appear to have 
rail vehicle related defects as causal factors.  In addition, there were also track defect related 
derailments on the transit side of the operation.  Based upon the circumstances of these events and 
other operational incidents, the SRP had concerns pertaining to the lack of CAPs focused on PMI 
and QA/QC activities; therefore, we recommended a “boots on the ground” detailed inspections 
of the Track and Vehicle maintenance areas from third party consultants with the appropriate 
subject matter expertise to aid in identifying safety hazards.  
 
The independent SME, who performed the vehicle maintenance evaluation, grouped his 
key findings of the transit operation into the following eight categories: (1) non-compliance to 
PMIs; (2) poor condition of Orange Line fleet; (3) unsatisfactory QA/QC activities; (4) 
unsatisfactory conditions at maintenance facilities; (5) low level of urgency following a safety 
related incident; (6) Reliability Centered Maintenance program only partially implemented; (7) 
insufficient management Dashboard/Key Performance Indicators (KPIs); and (8) industrial safety 
deficiencies. The following narrative highlights some, but not all, of the safety concerns identified 
by the rail vehicle SME. 
 
The SME found indications that vehicle PMI activities had not been adequately conducted, 
as one example, an equipment housing cover had not been removed, as required, to inspect internal 
components. With regard to the key finding pertaining to “low level of urgency following a major 
safety related incident”, the SME reported that following the June 11, 2019 Red Line derailment, 
the root cause of this incident was quickly suspected as a fatigue fracture failure of the axle caused 
by a systematic failure of the axle grounding system. The ensuing corrective action plan included 
the immediate ultrasound testing of all the axles on the entire rail fleet. This action consumed most 
of the investigation and corrective efforts of the MBTA technical staff.  Consequently, the critical 
action to immediately inspect all ground brush assemblies and axle rings was largely delayed by 
the focus on the ultrasound testing and partially by the publication of an engineering procedure to 
upgrade the methodology required for this inspection task. More than 90 days after the derailment 
(a period long enough for one inspection cycle of the entire fleet), a basic check of all the ground 
brush assemblies and axle rings could have been performed; however, less than a third of the fleet 
had been done. 
 
In addition, during a site visit to a MBTA transit rail vehicle maintenance facility, the SME 
observed easily identifiable QA/QC process lapses that should have been flagged and remediated 
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by local supervision: No post inspection hands-on maintenance audits, improper tagging of 
defective parts, and storing defective and good parts together instead of isolating them.  The SME 
also identified a shipment of new axles’ ground brushes was missing the “condemning level 
marking”, which is an important visual indicator for a mechanic to identify that the brush needs to 
be replaced. As another specific example of lax QA/QC oversight, the basic function of tightening 
bolts presented numerous concerns.  The calibration dates of the torque wrenches were expired; 
however, the bolts were still installed and lastly, the required witness marks6 were not present on 
the newly installed bolts.  
 
The SME observed that 1979-81 Hawker-Siddeley fleet of 120 (114 active) cars operated 
on the Orange Line is scheduled to be retired by the commissioning of the CRRC new fleet. Based 
on this schedule, it can be deducted, but not justified, that any significant work on the existing 
Orange Line cars has been deferred. The problem with this cost savings strategy is that often the 
new cars are either delivered late or even when delivered on time, they undergo an unstable phase 
characterized by infant mortality, software bugs, or design issues, all of which will delay their 
timely introduction into passenger service. Today the Hawker-Siddeley cars show extensive car 
body corrosion, and in one instance, severe shelling of train wheel (see Picture 1 below).  Potential 
causative factors of wheel shelling are fatigue breakdown, poor track/roadbed conditions, 
excessive loads, rail adhesion issues due to propulsion and/or braking problems. Unmanaged 
vegetation can also create wheel adhesion issues, which will be elaborated on in the Safety 
Assurance section of the report. 
 
 
 
 
The rail vehicle SME also looked at the commuter rail vehicle maintenance practices.  Once 
again while not perfect, they were performing much better than their colleagues in transit.  The 
SME’s key findings of Keolis were grouped into three categories: (1)marginal material quality 
control; (2) marginal conditions at maintenance facilities; and (3) high turnover in the Keolis Chief 
Mechanical Officer position.                                                         
6 Witness marks are produced by placing a highly visible strip of paint across the head of the bolt, the nut and then 
on to an adjacent fixed surface.  This practice alerts an inspector to any loosing of the securement hardware as the 
paint strips will no longer be in proper alignment. 
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The SME also met with the MBTA Senior Technical Manager to discuss the new car 
project management plan, quality program and commissioning of the CRRC new cars on the Red 
and Orange Lines.  The SME categorized his key findings into seven areas: (1) outdated master 
test plan of Orange Line; (2) lack of official inspection procedures; (3) missing life cycle 
maintenance program; (4) commercial issues due to potential trade tariffs; (5) missing elements of 
the qualification tests program; and (6) ergonomic issues with boarding/alighting to and from the 
road and (7) provided commentary on a recent door safety related failure.   
 
The rail vehicle SME provided recommendations to MBTA leadership and they are 
working toward addressing these concerns.  As a start, MBTA management has stated that they 
will bring in an independent third-party consultant to oversee the vehicle maintenance QA/QC 
functions. 
 
HNTB, a major engineering and infrastructure firm in the transportation industry, was 
contracted to perform an independent evaluation, which encompasses all tracks, wayside 
infrastructure, the contact rail, which is commonly referred to as the third rail and the Overhead 
Contact System (OCS).  This inspection is limited to the transit operation, where the Panel believes 
the greatest risk is present.  HNTB is providing daily reports to transit leadership of their findings 
and immediately alerts management if significant defects are identified, which can impact safe 
operations. The inspections commenced on September 14, 2019. As of October 31, 2019, HNTB 
identified 1121 “discrete items of concern” of which 46 (.04%) were immediate safety concerns. 
 
In discussions with MBTA transit management, it appears that many of the defects 
identified by HNTB had been previously identified and documented by track inspectors (see 
Picture 2 below that depicts consecutive defective ties and missing fasteners).  Therefore, in past 
practice, it appears that management did not effectively react appropriately to employee reports of 
track defects and take immediate remedial actions or when appropriate, install track restrictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
MBTA leadership is working diligently to correct the defects found by HNTB inspectors 
and responds appropriately when alerted to an immediate safety concern. MOW managers have 
established a tracking system to ensure all items are appropriately prioritized and addressed.  
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Additionally, their management has been performing a crosswalk of HNTB’s finding against their 
internal inspection processes to identify and correct shortcomings in their current program. The 
SRP is pleased with speed in which the T acted upon the recommendation to have independent 
inspections performed and is encouraged by the actions being taken to address the SME’s findings.    
 
Based upon these outcomes and discussions with agency employees, there may be other 
key legacy system assets that should also be evaluated by third party SMEs to determine whether 
the proper PMI and QA/QC functions are occurring, such as Fire/Life/Safety systems (standpipes), 
Ventilation and Drainage assets, as some examples. 
 
Overall, the agency approach to mitigating hazards seems to be heavily reliant on long term 
Capital investments, which appears to be done at the expense of properly maintaining legacy 
system assets and keeping them in a state of good repair (SOGR).  SOGR is defined as the 
condition in which a capital asset7 is able to operate at a full level of performance. When transit 
assets are not in good repair, the consequences include increased safety risks, decreased system 
reliability, higher maintenance costs, and lower system performance. 
 
As a result of supporting the accelerated Capital Program, many of the maintenance and 
engineering personnel are being pulled from their normal day-to day functions that are necessary 
to deliver reliable passenger service.  If not addressed, this practice will further exacerbate safety 
concerns such as deferred PMIs and increase the backlog of work orders pertaining to maintaining 
legacy system assets at a fully functional level.   
 
While the SRP recognizes the diligent efforts that have been made to improve 
organizational performance and safety, there still needs to be a balance created between delivering 
the Capital Program and keeping pace with PMIs and ensuring legacy system assets are fully 
functional. Therefore, this circumstance should be further evaluated as part of Safety Risk 
Management activities and CAPs implemented to address this safety exposure.  
 
VI. SAFETY ASSURANCE 
 
An essential part of Safety Assurance is safety performance monitoring and measurement, 
which has four key activities that must occur; analysis of Safety Risk Management mitigation data, 
monitoring of regular operations, monitoring information from employee safety reporting systems, 
and event investigations. 
 
Analysis of Safety Risk Management Mitigation Data 
 
Analysis of safety risk management verifies that mitigations are implemented, mitigations 
are effective/appropriate and performing as intended, and reduces safety risk and verifies that new 
hazards have not been introduced.   
 
The MBTA is experiencing repetitive operational incidents; therefore, it is apparent that 
current mitigating strategies are not effective/appropriate and are not performing as intended.  As                                                         7 Capital assets principally include equipment, rolling stock, infrastructure, and facilities. 
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part of SMS, the CAPs intended to address operational incidents should have been sent back 
through the Safety Risk Management process to be re-evaluated and revised.  However, this action 
is not occurring, i.e. transit management and safety personnel are not conducting a consequential 
analysis of safety risk management data as evidenced by the independent rail vehicle and track 
SME’s findings.  
 
Monitoring of Regular Operations 
 
Field observations differ greatly from auditing and inspections, as they are designed to 
promote the collection of safety data by simply watching employees work in his/her normal work 
settings.  Field observations also highlight compliance with actual agency policies and practices, 
and are critical to ensuring that mitigations are working as intended.  The results of observations 
should be regularly reported to management and reviewed. 
 
As part of the safety assessment, SRP members interacted with MBTA mass transit and 
commuter rail staff in a variety of settings to conduct observations of field activities.  As one 
example, Panel members performed a head-car ride on a segment of the Red Line for the purpose 
of engaging employees and performing roadway observations.  In conversations with motor-
persons, it became evident that they could not identify a specific individual as their immediate 
supervisor.  Nor was there any indication that supervision was performing routine ride checks to 
gauge the caliber of individual employee’s performance.  The conversations also raised concerns 
regarding the working knowledge of one motor-person.  When ask if he had experienced any safety 
issues of late, the motor-person informed the Panel that he was able to attain a greater than design 
speed on a rail vehicle, although the vehicle was in a restricted operating mode.  When the SRP 
looked into this concern, we were informed that this is a known characteristic of this car class, 
which is part of the older fleet.  Apparently, if these cars are operated on a downgrade in a restricted 
mode, according to their training, the motor-person is required to introduce a brake to control the 
speed of the train.  The motor-person apparently was not aware of this operational nuance, which 
calls into question the caliber of the training. 
 
In addition, during the train ride, a number of readily identifiable deficiencies were 
observed, i.e. unsecured fire extinguishers in train operator cabs, minor ride quality issues 
attributed to track conditions, sun bleached or dirty wayside signage, a hanging electrical conduit, 
as well as significant vegetation control issues.  The SRP was especially concerned with the 
vegetation control issues, which on the surface may sound minor, but it can have serious 
consequences.   
 
The MBTA’s Light Rail Transit, Track Maintenance and Safety Standards, section LRT 
213.37 states,  
 
“Vegetation on MBTA property which is within or immediately adjacent to the track area 
must be controlled.  Vegetation is a deterrent to drainage and causes a wide range of problems 
within the right of way.  Some consequences of vegetation control are: 
 
(a) Fouled roadbed and ballast sections from roots and vines. 
(b) Fire hazard, especially in dry weather or in the autumn. 
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(c) Obstructed visibility with respect to wayside signals, speed signs, etc. 
(d) Safety hazard due to line-of-sight interference for operating personnel. 
(e) Interference to employees performing track, power or signal duties. 
(f) Improper functioning of signal and communication equipment.” 
 
In addition to the issues stated above, low hanging or fallen tree limbs have the potential 
to derail or strike moving trains, as well as injure a motor-person.  Wet leaves on the running rails 
can result in rail adhesion issues and subsequently trains sliding through stations.  This 
circumstance is not only disruptive to operations, it often results in train wheels developing flat 
spots and shelling, which accelerate the mortality rate of the wheel and are costly to correct.  HNTB 
personnel routinely captured vegetation control issues throughout their inspections - two examples 
are depicted below.  
 
 
 
 
At the onset of the assessment, the SRP discussed the status of the vegetation control 
program with transit management and was informed that it had been suspended.  The funding for 
this activity had been exhausted as it was tied to other contractor support functions, such as snow 
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removal. During the discussion, a senior transit manager pointed out that unabated foliage was the 
number one cause of fire/smoke conditions or “Code 1” events at the T.   
 
Performing vegetation control is low hanging fruit that costs the agency a minimal amount 
of money, yet it produces very tangible safety, operational and financial benefits, i.e. it reduces 
costly damage to train wheels, results in less system fires that can lead to service disruptions, and 
improves employee safety.  
 
Conversely, during head car rides on a commuter rail line (Fairmont), it was apparent that 
the vegetation control program was effective.  When a manager overseeing the Keolis contract was 
asked about their vegetation control program, he laughed and said, “I stopped just short of de-
forestation.” This individual had a full understanding of both the necessity and benefits of 
conducting vegetation control.  It should be mentioned that the commuter rail line experienced a 
mainline derailment on March 8, 2018, on the Lowell Line at Wilmington Interlocking due to a 
train striking a tree/log during a weather related incident.  The corrective actions included 
increased tree trimming along the ROW (see Picture 5 below).  This incident should have raised 
red flags on the transit side of the house and provided ample justification for funding the vegetation 
control program. 
 
 
 
 
It appears that on the transit side of the T operation, in many instances, financial 
considerations take precedence over operational performance and safety, even when it is extremely 
detrimental to the organization as described above. This mindset demonstrates an “upside down” 
set of priorities for running a transit agency.  MBTA transit management has since reallocated 
funds to the vegetation control program and has resumed this activity.   
 
A significant portion of the MBTA’s invasive maintenance activities occurs during late 
night hours as this is the most opportune time to perform work. These activities often involve 
complex operations that expose employees to significant hazards. In discussions with MBTA 
leadership, the agency’s Mechanical & Engineering (M&E) transit management does not have a 
prominent presence in the field during over-night hours, which is when the most work is being 
conducted. Appropriate managerial oversight is essential to ensure productivity, evaluate the 
caliber of work being conducted and to improve the safety oversight of the workforce.  In order to 
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monitor daily operations, leadership needs to be routinely present in the field.  MBTA management 
has committed to improving in this area. 
 
In addition, there is essentially no safety personnel present once the day-shift ends. The 
SRP was told that one safety person works the PM shift and there is an “on-call” person for the 
mid-night tour.  In the event of an incident, senior Safety department personnel will respond to the 
scene depending on the severity of the incident.  This once again illustrates that the Safety 
department is reacting to lagging indicators, as opposed to proactively championing safety in the 
field. The Safety department is performing an analysis of their current level of resources and 
functions to address this issue.  
 
Employee Safety Reporting 
 
Safety Assurance activities are heavily dependent upon effective employee reporting to 
collect critical safety information.   The current culture of blame and retaliation at the MBTA’s 
transit operation is impeding the T’s ability to achieve a greater level of risk management.  As a 
result of the “blame” culture, the SRP believes that many safety issues today most likely go 
unreported by the workforce. 
 
Perceived or real, employees in general do not trust their leadership and therefore, do not 
share what is happening in the field.  They fear heavy-handed discipline will result. The workforce 
doesn’t feel supported and are clearly frustrated with management’s lack of responsiveness to their 
needs. We heard of countless situations where employees ask for needed safety equipment or 
support without any action occurring. During this review, we also heard and gained first-hand 
knowledge of employees, who reported safety issues over and over to a point where they lost faith 
in management’s ability to care about getting anything done.   
 
In organizations where there is widespread distrust between labor and management, third 
party safety reporting systems have been successful.  The information collected is scrubbed of any 
identifying characteristics by an external third party before it is shared with the agency to protect 
the identity of the reporter.  One example of a non-punitive confidential close call reporting system 
is the C3RS, which is in place at Keolis.  This system is a partnership between the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and FRA, in conjunction with participating 
railroad carriers and labor organizations. Employees can report safety issues or “close calls” 
voluntarily and confidentially through a third party.  
 
Another confidential close call reporting program is operated by the Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics (BTS) under an agreement with the Washington Metropolitan Area 
Transit Authority (WMATA), which allows their employees to voluntarily report close call events 
without threat of disciplinary action. BTS also protects data and information collected for 
statistical purposes under the “Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act” 
(CIPSEA) of 2002, which established uniform confidentiality protections over disclosure and use. 
 
Event Investigations 
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The FTA requires transit agencies to include the investigation of safety events as part of 
their PTASP.  The level of safety at an organization is often directly linked to its capacity to 
conduct an effective accident investigation, as this activity is central to identifying causal or 
contributing factors in events. Effective investigations require the knowledge of SMEs to aid in 
identifying deviations from current operating or maintenance practices, as well as independence 
to ensure the objectivity of the process.  
 
The MBTA Safety department is responsible for producing the agency’s final accident 
investigation reports; however, there is only a single person within the Safety department’s 
accident investigation team that can be considered a SME.  This individual has Transportation 
Operations experience. Therefore, the Safety department cannot lead an independent, 
comprehensive accident investigation, and this inadequacy is even more pronounced for events 
centered around M&E issues.  
  
As one example, on February 5, 2019, there was a derailment on the Green Line between 
Beaconsfield and Brookline Hill Stations, which involved wheel climb at a track rail joint.  There 
were multiple track defects simultaneously co-existing at the Point of Derailment (POD).  The 
curved segment of track involved in the derailment had recently had a rail replaced at the POD, 
which created a mismatch from the head of the existing rail to the new one.  There was a 
significantly deteriorated wooden railroad tie that potentially created rail joint support failure 
(pumping of the wooden railroad tie beneath the rail joint).  The deteriorated wooden railroad tie 
in question was replaced during post incident activities, which also corrected an existing wide 
gauge defect.  The pictures taken at the time of incident, reflected that both of the track plates 
beneath the rail joint were missing securement hardware (spikes) on the field side of rail.  Lastly, 
there was approximately ½ inch of lateral rail movement as evidenced by the markings made by 
the track plates shifting on the surface of the wooden railroad tie (see Picture 6 below).  
 
Picture 6: Green Line Derailment between Beaconsfield and Brookline Hill Stations. 
 
 
 
Deteriorated wooden tie 
    
 
Missing Spikes 
Mismatched rail ends 
Evidence of plate movement 
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MBTA Track Maintenance and Safety Standards8 states that track defects should not be 
viewed in isolation and that remedial action may be required when a combination of track 
conditions are present.  In this event, based upon the cumulative effect of the defects, the 
appropriate action to advert a derailment should have been to either perform immediate repairs or 
have an operational restriction placed on that segment of track.  Obviously, this did not occur.  
 
The Safety department report found that although there were multiple track defects present 
at the POD, no single defect was out of tolerance; therefore, there were no recommendations made 
and no CAPs were created.  The primary corrective actions were the replacement of the 
deteriorated tie and the profiling of the rail ends, which are symptoms of a poor PMI regimen. 
These corrective actions do little to globally prevent a future derailment. 
 
The circumstances described above should have raised numerous red flags for an 
experienced accident investigator with rudimentary M&E Track experience.  However, there did 
not appear to be any diagnostic activities performed to gauge the health of the Track department’s 
PMI programs.  As some examples, there was no discussion in the report to determine when the 
last time a track inspection occurred; whether the inspections were occurring at the required 
intervals, whether the existing defects were previously identified or whether they were correctly 
risk ranked according to MBTA track inspection standards.  Nor were the results of any recent 
automated inspections available, i.e. track geometry and ultrasonic testing. Other potential 
contributing factors that are typically explored in an investigation were not discussed, i.e. were the 
track inspectors responsible for the area properly trained? Is the training adequate and is he/she in 
compliance with initial and recertification training?  
 
The same investigation report does not speak to any safety concerns surrounding the rail 
renewal activities, i.e. Why was the original rail replaced? Why was the new rail left improperly 
secured (missing spikes)? Why was the new rail left sitting on a significantly deteriorated wooden 
railroad tie?  And why wasn’t the wide gauge or rail head mismatch addressed?  These 
circumstances call into question the caliber of maintenance activities, as well as the qualifications 
of the individual supervising the installation of the new rail and management oversight practices  
in general.  
 
In addition, it appears that once management has identified what they perceive to be the 
“root cause” of an incident, the organization narrowly turns its attention to a single causal factor.  
This practice reduces the likelihood that any secondary contributing factors will be surfaced and 
appears to be the most prevalent when a human error is identified as the root cause of an incident.  
The Green Line derailment that occurred at Riverside Station on August 7, 2019, appears to 
crystalize this circumstance. The event was attributed to a “rookie” operator’s failure to identify 
an incorrectly aligned track switch, which subsequently resulted in a derailment after he “trailed 
the switch”9.                                                           
8 MBTA MOW Division, Green Line – Light Rail Transit, Track Maintenance and Safety Standards, LRT 213.1 
Scope, states in part, “…The requirement prescribed in this section apply to specific track conditions existing in 
isolation.  Therefore, a combination of track conditions, none of which individually amounts to a deviation from the 
requirements of this section, may require remedial action to provide safe operations over the track.” 
9 The term “Trailed Switch” is common transit industry vernacular used to describe a circumstance where the switch 
points of a track switch are not properly aligned for train movement off of a specific track(s).  The train operator 
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At the time of the incident, the organization appeared to be content with this determination, 
which is illustrative of a “blame culture.”  In subsequent discussions between the SRP and MBTA 
transit management, the Panel expressed the belief that disciplining employees for operational 
errors will not substantially reduce the frequency of these events; however, implementing sensible 
strategies to mitigate risk will. 
 
Motor-persons are trained to determine switch position by “reading the iron”, i.e. observing 
the position of the switch points to confirm that they are correctly aligned for the move in progress.  
The track switch involved in this incident is not equipped with any device that provides a visual 
cue to motor-persons to aid them in determining the position of the switch points.  The installation 
of a switch stand that typically has a green or yellow flag attached or other similar technology is a 
relatively inexpensive retrofit that can be implemented to reduce the likelihood of future trailed 
switches.  The switch position can also be tied into the signal system and prevent a clear aspect 
from being displayed unless all of the switches in the route are properly aligned.  In addition, there 
are critical locations on the Green Line where the MBTA’s operating rulebook requires a motor-
person must restore a track switch to its “normal” position after use.  The rarely used track switch 
involved in this derailment may be another candidate for such a rule designation. Transit 
management has since reconsidered disciplining the employee involved in the event and they are 
contemplating design modifications for this model of track switch.  In addition, Operations and 
Safety management is evaluating the current training of motor-persons. 
 
The SRP performed a field visit to another derailment site (St. Mary’s Station). In this 
instance, the MBTA’s derailment committee determined that the track switch had operated beneath 
a non-revenue train that was traversing it, resulting in a derailment.  The root cause was determined 
to be a failed cotter pin, which permitted a securement bolt to back out of its yoke, which was 
followed by the undesired movement of the switch points.  
 
A Track manager briefed the SRP member on the actions being taken to prevent a similar 
derailment in the future.  The securement hardware for the yoke assembly was modified to a more 
robust design.  When asked if the agency had an approved engineering drawing that details the 
modifications, the manager said that documentation was not prepared.  However, he went on to 
state that the new design was reviewed and verbally approved by the Track Engineering 
department. Upon entering the trackway and examining the switch involved in the derailment, 
there was a new bolt and securement hardware installed; however, it was not the same components 
as the “approved” hardware.  In addition, a second switch in the area was visually examined and 
although it had upgraded hardware installed, it also was not the Track Engineering “approved” 
hardware.   
 
Part of safety risk mitigation analysis is to verify that new hazards are not being introduced; 
therefore, the alteration of asset components should follow a regimented engineering design 
modification and documentation process. The above circumstance demonstrates lax configuration 
control protocols and reflects that the M&E department is not sufficiently involving the Safety 
department in critical day-to-day decisions.                                                           
than traverses the track switch and damages the track switch components, which will oftentimes result in a 
derailment. 
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All of the issues identified above should have been flagged as part of event investigation 
activities. In addition, there should be a healthy tension between Safety and Operations personnel 
when performing investigations; there is not. The MBTA derailment committee structure heavily 
relies on Operating personnel to identify causation.  As a result of the Safety department’s lack of 
SMEs, they are basically rubber-stamping Operation’s findings without challenge.  
 
Operations managers are not independent; therefore, investigations are further hampered 
by a blame culture, where culpable managers may not bring information forward out of fear of 
reprisal.  Consequently, the final investigatory product is not surfacing the systemic safety issues 
that are impacting the organization’s performance. This circumstance calls into question, the 
“sufficiency and thoroughness” of the investigations and demonstrates a need to substantially 
improve in this area. 
 
The safety departments of many large transit agencies have dedicated SMEs, whose 
primary function is to conduct incident investigations.  The MBTA should benchmark accident 
investigation practices utilized by their peers and adopt the practices best suited for the T.  Once 
again, the commuter rail side of the MBTA operation appears to be performing much better in this 
area, as the safety team at Keolis contains a number of qualified SMEs.  
 
Effective PMI programs, as well as QA/QC activities, are the agency’s primary defenses 
against operational incidents.  Intense concentration on these activities should be one of the central 
focuses of an accident investigation. More importantly, simply performing required PMIs and 
having effective QA/QC programs will dramatically reduce operational incidents. 
 
James Reasons developed the “Swiss Cheese” model to illustrate an organization’s 
defenses against failure.  These series of barriers are represented as slices of swiss cheese. See 
Figure 2 below.  The holes in the slices represent weakness in individual parts of the system and 
are continually varying in size and position across the slices. The system produces failures when 
a hole in each slice momentarily aligns, permitting “a trajectory of accident opportunity” so that a 
hazard passes through holes in all of the slices, leading to failure. 
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Figure 2: James Reason – Swiss Cheese Model10 
 
 
 
The Safety department would benefit from implementing a dedicated independent 
investigation team that has both the skillset and the bandwidth to delve deeper into incidents.  Once 
MBTA management has a better understanding of the causal and contributing factors that are 
driving the agency’s undesired events, they will be better prepared to formulate and implement 
CAPs.   
 
VII. SAFETY PROMOTION 
 
The Safety Promotion component of SMS requires the agency to establish a comprehensive 
training program for all agency employees and contractors responsible for the management of 
safety in their system.  The training must include refresher training as necessary.  
 
Training Programs: 
 
The SRP observed that the MBTA transit training function is decentralized which creates 
internal oversight issues regarding assessing the consistency and caliber of the training that is being 
delivered.  Specialized training is often delivered by union leadership or is housed within the 
various MOW departments. The SRP choose to meet with transit Operations Training team to 
discuss their processes, as this group is the largest training entity at the T.  Training is another area 
that is somewhat data deprived due to not having effective data collection systems in place.  
Therefore, it is unknown if all the required initial and recertification training is occurring or can 
be validated.  In addition, there are no global targets and indicators to alert executive management 
of the status of training compliance rates at the agency. 
  
The Panel was told that the operation’s training group was hit hard by budget cuts 
previously imposed by senior management.  While the reduction in everyone’s budget was 
universally applied across the agency, other parts of the organization were able to absorb some of                                                         
10 Figure 2: The labels contained within Figure 2 were created by the SRP for illustrative purposes. 
Leadership 
PMI & QA/QC 
Investigations 
CAPs & KPIs 
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the financial impact by reducing non-personnel expenditures, such as material purchases.  The 
training group had to surrender  personnel to meet the target due to having a small  material budget.  
 
This reduction created challenges meeting their existing workloads and it has been 
compounded by providing ROW training to waves of contractor personnel coming onboard to 
support the accelerated Capital Program. This group was also heavily relied upon to support the 
manual block operation following the Red Line derailment.  However, if we set these two recent 
demands aside, the previous headcount reduction resulted in them continuously over-running their 
overtime budget.   
  
Training management and budget personnel have a scheduled monthly meeting where 
overtime is discussed.  The Panel was told that each month, the Operations Training staff asks for 
additional headcount to keep pace with their workload, and each month the budget personnel 
chastises them for not staying within budget.  When asked by the Panel how many times has the 
same discussion been repeated at these meetings, the manager estimated that it was approximately 
20 months in a row.  This recurring meeting provides no resolution to this dilemma and reflects 
organizational paralysis. This circumstance illustrates the need for an organization-wide zero 
based budget (ZBB) analysis. The Panel was told that there will be a headcount increase in 
Operations Training staff. 
 
Select SRP members attended the required ROW and RWP training to be certified to enter 
the roadway.  In addition, attending the training provided the Panel members with the opportunity 
to informally audit the courses.  The ROW class was scheduled to start at 07:00 hours at which 
time, approximately forty-three people arrived to take the course.  The volume of attendees and a 
lack of a defined class roster resulted in a substantial delay (one hour and thirteen minutes) before 
the actual training commenced.  The SRP was informed that past practice was to have two people 
deliver the training:  One would handle the administrative functions, while the other concentrated 
on teaching. 
 
The late start and volume of students created time management challenges for the lone 
instructor that were manifested by him somewhat hurrying through the course to stay on schedule.  
As a result, critical information was often glossed over or not discussed at all.  In the most glaring 
example, the instructor skipped over the slides pertaining to the bus safety portion of training.  
Many of the individuals in attendance were contractors and it is unknown if they will be working 
in areas where bus safety training is relevant. In addition, the instructor wrote the answers to the 
five questions regarding the bus safety curriculum on the chalkboard for the class to use on the 
final exam. This act improved the student’s odds of passing the course and receiving a ROW 
certification card.   
 
The SRP was informed that professional color training manuals are no longer printed by 
an external vendor due to budget constraints.  As a result, staff has resorted to printing the manuals 
in black and white to cut down on expenses.  This is problematic as there are a variety of different 
color flags needed to establish ROW protection; however, all of the different color flagging devices 
appear as black objects in the training manual.  The current training manual has not been revised 
to adapt to this challenge, which could be done by labeling the flagging devices.   
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These deficiencies are troubling. This class may be the first introduction to a rail transit 
environment for many of the students.  The speed in which critical material was covered raises 
concerns that novices to the transit industry may not have absorbed enough working knowledge to 
recognize a ROW procedural error or that they will not have the confidence to invoke a Good Faith 
Challenge11 if they are in a dangerous situation. 
 
The ROW training course also raised concerns regarding the organization’s understanding 
of the requirements for the use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).  The training was not 
consistent.  One training class did not define helmets or eye protection as requirements for entering 
the right of way, while a different training forum stated helmets are required.  There was no 
mention in the ROW training regarding wearing appropriate footwear until reaching the discussion 
of entering construction sites. This circumstance appears to be more of a lack of organizational 
clarity on the requirements for PPE usage, as opposed to a training issue.   
 
As one example, a Panel member responded to a live derailment scene occurring at the 
Reservoir yard.  While at the site, it was observed that very few individuals other than management 
were wearing helmets or eye protection.  Many of the frontline employees were engaged in 
activities such as removing track switch covers, or repositioning re-railing equipment without 
wearing work gloves.  Additionally, the employees at the derailment site had on a wide variety of 
footwear.  MBTA management at the site did not raise any exceptions to these circumstances. 
Therefore, the workforce does not have a clear signal as to what is expected for PPE usage at the 
organization. Transit management needs to define their minimum standards for PPE, communicate 
the standards to the workforce and enforce them. 
 
The ROW and RWP training is another area where the MBTA may benefit from 
benchmarking against other transit agencies.  Many RTAs include a field exercise as part of the 
curriculum to expose students to live train movement under direct supervision in a very controlled 
environment. 
 
Communications: 
 
Safety Promotion also requires the agency leadership to communicate safety and safety 
performance information throughout the organization, that at a minimum conveys information on 
hazards and safety risks relevant to employee’s roles and responsibilities.  Communication should 
also inform employees of safety actions taken in response to reports submitted through an 
employee safety reporting system.    
 
MBTA leadership has not established critical KPIs; therefore, performance information 
cannot be disseminated.  This circumstance creates an environment where agency executive 
management and the FMCB are blind to organizational risk and safety is not at the forefront of the 
MBTA.  As such, correcting this circumstance must be a priority for the organization from both a 
safety and operational effectiveness standpoint. Let us circle back to some of the recent 
derailments. It is plausible that many of these events could have been averted had KPIs for rule                                                         
11 The Good Faith Challenge process permits an individual to challenge the level of ROW protection provided if 
they do not believe the current level of roadway worker protection is adequate for the task at hand or is not correctly 
implemented.  
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conformance testing, PMIs and QA/QC measures existed and performance deficiencies in these 
areas been previously addressed. In addition, it is telling that no one at senior levels of the agency 
or FMCB recognized this lack of data as a short-coming.  Therefore, the skillset of both parties 
should be examined and corrective actions developed to improve performance. 
 
Budget reports are measuring the performance of the financial plan, but a more 
comprehensive measurement system is needed with key metrics to monitor service.  Performance 
measurement data can provide transit agency management with objective assessments of current 
circumstances, past trends, existing concerns, and unmet needs.  It should track how well the 
agency is delivering daily service and should include tracking of the reliability of service, the 
quality of customer contacts with agency staff, passengers’ physical comfort while using transit, 
and the achievement of service goals.  The system should also monitor passenger’s travel time and 
the customers’ perception of the overall reliability of the system.  
  
As mentioned earlier, employees lack trust in their leadership or fear retribution so they 
generally refrain from reporting issues or identifying themselves in any reports.  Therefore, until 
this issue is corrected, leadership will not be receiving a significant amount of employee reports 
of safety concerns, which can result in lingering safety concerns going unaddressed. 
 
Continuous Improvement 
  
Continuous Improvement 12  is a process by which a transit agency examines safety 
performance to identify safety deficiencies and carry out a plan to address identified safety 
deficiencies.  Evaluation of the SMS is necessary to ensure that it effectively and efficiently allows 
the agency to meet safety objectives and performance targets.  Transit agencies should address any 
identified weaknesses in SMS organizational structures, processes and resources in a timely 
manner, and should also complete annual reviews of overall safety performance. 
 
Continuous improvement occurs from: 
 
• Timely safety information that enables executives to make informed decisions about 
allocating resources 
• Accountability being placed at the appropriate levels of authority 
• The ability to actively identify hazards and mitigate safety risk, based on prioritized 
allocation of resources 
• Support for system-wide communication about safety issues up, down and across the agency 
• An improved safety culture that empowers employees and solicits information from them on 
safety hazards and concerns. 
 
Continuous improvement is an auditing function which allows the agency to: 
 
• Assess the effectiveness of the SMS to determine if it is performing as intended 
• Assess adherence to agency’s written and intended SMS policy, procedures and processes                                                         
12 Federal Transit Administration, SMS Safety Assurance Participant Guide, v12_09282018 was used as the basis 
for the material in the continuous improvement discussion. 
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• Identify the causes of sub-standard performance 
• Develop corrective action plans to address sub-standard performance 
 
CAPs are instituted when the SMS, or any part of it, is not being performed properly. Perhaps 
hazards are not being identified, no one is addressing the condition once the hazard is identified, 
or agencies are not following through on implementation activities or data collection.   
 
Continuous improvement tools and activities include conducting self-assessments, audits, gap 
analysis and external reviews.  The results of continuous improvement activities must include 
identification of breakdowns and disconnects, such as practical drift13 and correct the process at 
the level where it is broken (frontline, department level, or at the broader organizational level). 
 
Even when fully implemented, the continuous improvement sub-component of SMS is always 
relevant and always improving to meet the needs of the agency. It should never be viewed as 
complete.  The transit industry is never static: personnel, equipment, technology, routes, tracks 
and the operating environment change constantly.  Therefore, SMS will continuously change, 
adapt and be refined, evolving as necessary to meet organizational changes and objectives. 
This evolution of the SMS is a primary goal of continuous improvement: ensuring that formal 
activities and tools are in place to regularly verify efficiency, effectiveness and ongoing 
improvements in the management of safety. 
 
SMS Maturity Level 
 
MBTA transit management has instituted the Safety Management Executive Review 
Committee (SMRC) to oversee and guide the implementation of SMS.  The committee is 
comprised of various internal stakeholders.  While the MBTA is making progress in implementing 
SMS, there is clearly a need for further improvement in the many areas described throughout this 
report. Therefore, one effective way to have a clear strategy for SMS implementation is to conduct 
an SMS gap analysis to determine the agency’s current SMS maturity level.   
 
One useful resource for performing that assessment is the SMS Gap Analysis Report14 
produced by the FTA while performing this activity at WMATA in 2015.  The report provides 
guidance that the MBTA can look to on how to conduct this activity.  The report contains 78 
questions regarding the status of the agency’s SMS. While each agency is different, this document 
provides a foundation for launching this exercise. 
 
The report is organized into four key areas: 
 
• SMS Levels of Maturity Table – presents the general criteria for maturity level placement and 
guidelines for SMS implementation phasing; 
• Summary of SMS Maturity Levels – provides an average score for each SMS major component 
and sub-component based on a scale of 1-4;                                                         
13 Practical Drift means the slow and inconspicuous, yet steady, uncoupling between written procedures and actual 
practices during the provision of services. 
14 US Department of Transportation, Federal Transit Administration SMS Gap Analysis Report, Washington 
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, June 17, 2015. 
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• SMS Gap Analysis Report Results – discusses results from the gap analysis by SMS 
component and presents the phase of implementation maturity; 
• SMS Maturity Table – presents the SMS maturity level for each SMS sub-component item. 
 
VIII. FINANCIAL REVIEW: 
 
Strategic Plan 
 
After being established in 2015, the charter of the FMCB was to formulate a strategic plan 
to stabilize and strengthen the financials, management, operations and asset condition of the 
MBTA. The legislation mandated that the plan provide a safe, reliable and sustainable transit 
system.  The plan was to be consistent with the state comprehensive transportation plan, establish 
fiscal stability and ensure that the Authority’s budgets were aligned with its operational and capital 
needs.  The plan was to also focus on providing better service, facilitating sound management, 
developing a financially responsible plan for preserving assets, meeting future needs for regional 
transit facilities and services.  In addition, the Board’s plan was to include performance metrics 
and measures. 
 
The FMCB has prepared a Strategic Plan. The importance of a Strategic Plan is to provide 
direction to MBTA. It should outline measurable goals. Strategic planning is a tool that is useful 
for guiding day-to-day decisions and also for evaluating progress and changing approaches when 
moving forward. 
 
The major elements of a strategic plan are:  Mission, vision, aspirations, core values, SWOT 
analysis and objectives. 
 
• The Vision statement, “MBTA will provide globally premier, safe, reliable, convenient, 
accessible, cost effective and sustainable transit service to its communities” is inclusive of 
safety and consistent with the legislative mandates.  Safety as the primary objective is 
somewhat obfuscated by the aspirational statement of the agency being “globally premier”. 
• The Mission statement that “MBTA provides access and moves people while strengthening 
and improving economic health of the region” does not allude to accomplishing this in a safe 
manner. 
• The Core values has safety at the top of the list.  Safety of the public and staff is top priority in 
the list of values set forth in the Plan. 
• The Guiding Principles of the plan has safety as the number one objective stating that the 
Agency should “Never compromise safety”. 
• The specific objective pertaining to safety in the plan is to “sustain the MBTA’s organizational 
commitment to ensuring the safety of passengers, the workforce and the general public”.  The 
plan indicates that this entails ensuring an organization-wide commitment to managing safety 
risk and assuring that all transit activities are adequately resourced and supported to achieve 
the highest level of safety performance.  The objective includes the four components of SMS: 
safety management policy, safety risk management, safety assurance and safety promotion.  
The objective states that the intent of SMS is to shift the safety culture from reactive to 
proactive. 
 
 29  
The benefit of strategic planning is that it is a formalized, documented organizational 
management process used to analyze the condition of the Agency, set priorities, and to 
focus resources.   Each of the principles in the plan were to be expanded with specific objectives, 
strategies, targets, and timelines for deliverables.  However, the objectives supporting Capital 
Delivery and fiscal control are the ones that have received the most focus and have been the priority 
of the Board.  Delivery of the Capital budget has become the backbone of the strategic and tactical 
planning for the agency. 
 
In its December 2018 update, the FMCB reported on the attainment of four Strategic Plan 
priorities and the timelines for those priorities.   Safety was not one of those priorities but could be 
implied in Key Priority number one.  They were as follows: 
 
• Key Priority 1:  Improve customer experience across the system, focus on buses, reinvent the 
bus system with reliable service, improved vehicle and bus stop amenities and a comprehensive 
redesign of the entire bus network 
• Key Priority 2:  Accelerate capital delivery spending to eliminate the SOGR backlog in 15 
years rather than the previous 25-year target 
• Key 3:  As part of the effort to deliver reliable service to affordable fares, have a new 
Automated Fare Collection (AFC) system by 2021, operating under a new fare structure that 
simultaneously drives revenue and ridership, while addressing affordability 
• Key Priority 4:  In order to eliminate the need for annually appropriated supplemental operating 
support while ensuring that the MBTA provides great value to users and taxpayers, continue 
to drive down operating costs and increase non-fare, own-source revenue to $100 million by 
2021. 
 
The FMCB also recognized in the safety objectives that “asset management and life-cycle 
maintenance are the keys to ensuring that the MBTA’s asset never again fall into disrepair”.  But 
there are no metrics measuring the performance of preventative maintenance.  The plan 
deliverables are defined as the implementation of the Transit Asset Management (TAM) system 
and delivery timeline for some major capital projects. 
 
Annual Budget 
 
The FMCB has been successful at managing, monitoring and focusing on balancing the 
operating budget.  The objective has been active budget management and maintaining fiscal 
discipline.   They have conveyed the purpose of the financial objectives to the organization and 
provided direction to make decisions on allocating resources at the MBTA.  In fact, the 
performance against budget has been the primary goal setting and monitoring activity at the agency 
in addition to year over year trends for the spend rates of capital. The budget is assiduously 
monitored on a monthly basis against the expected financial levels approved for the current year.  
This process has controlled the deficit spending.  The initial FY20 budget had a deficit of $36.5M 
and staff indicated that requests for additional expenses were about $150M more than allocated 
over the prior year’s budget.  The budget is balanced for the fiscal year, but the proforma forecasts 
recognized that there are challenges to sustaining that in the future. 
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The strategic plan objectives for capital delivery seem to be the most widely disseminated 
throughout the organization with less emphasis on safety.  There has been significant focus on 
fiscal control to the detriment of the operating budget combined with a focus on increasing the 
throughput of capital delivery.  The charter of financial controls has led to several years of deep 
budget reductions which has permeated every level of the organization and left Operations the 
hardest hit.  The budgeting culture is characterized as a totally top down approach.   The expense 
reduction process has been dictated as an across the board percentage cut.  The positive to that 
approach is that it is easier to manage and meet the financial goal of a balanced fiscal year budget.  
But the consequence to that approach is that it lacks input from those on the front line delivering 
the service.   The across the board percentage reduction mandate has led to some serious manpower 
shortages in critical departments that support operations and service delivery.  Budget resources 
are lacking in critical areas (training, manpower for operators needed to build and make schedules, 
maintenance crews, emergency response teams and safety) which may be affecting the safe 
delivery of services.   There is also no contingency in the budget for safety emergency related 
issues.  These are addressed on a as-needed basis by realigning budget from other departments or 
through the Pay Go fund if it is capital related. 
 
From discussions with staff, there has not been critical or clear assessments of their 
functions and needs. A recommended approach to this issue would be implementation of a ZBB 
process, where each department must justify the need for positions and expenses that support the 
core business function of delivering transit services to the public.  The objective of ZBB is to look 
for efficient ways to evaluate and allocate costs.   ZBB is a more resource intense budget process, 
but it would be offering more fairness and improve communications with the front line.  In the 
Focus group sessions conducted by the Panel, there were comments from operations departments 
that have been “cut to the bone”.  The current perception is that operations is subject to the same 
percentage reductions as some overhead and administrative functions that do not support customer 
service or generate revenue. 
 
To compound the issues of evaluating resources is the lack of organizational charts.  
Organizational charts are needed for all levels of the organization to provide transparency, 
information and accountability about functions.  There are fragmentation of support service and 
operation delivery functions such as Procurement, Contract Administration and Training.  
Organizational charts would aid in the assessments of functions, their efficiency, alignment and 
the criticality to the core business of the organization for service delivery. 
 
A ZBB process would force a review of the needs and resources of critical functions.   With 
the potential challenges for the future, it is time to examine the mix of expenses in the budget and 
to look at ways to provide more of an opportunity to assess secondary effects of financial decisions. 
This will ensure that within the funding parameters, there are sufficient allocations for critical 
functions.  This assessment should not be performed by working from the top down, making the 
biggest decisions behind closed doors without enough input from front line staff. 
 
Inclusive communications and processes at all levels of the organization is not only missing 
in the budgeting process but also in the policy and planning decisions.  Reaching out to all levels 
of the organizations represents an opportunity for improved communications and to obtain 
thoughtful input and guidance on complex issues at the agency. 
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In an article on lessons learned from the recovery efforts of Hurricane Katrina, Scott 
Cowen, who was the President of Tulane University, stated “Disregarding different and opposing 
perspectives can block the emergence of ideas and solutions. Leadership should never be about 
one person’s agenda; it’s about facts, mission, vision, values, and principles. Consequently, it is 
of great importance to seek inclusive dialogue.”  He emphasized the importance of seeing the entire 
picture.  MBTA could benefit greatly from the perspective of those doing the work on the front 
line, who not only respond to emergencies but also deal with daily operations. 
 
Capital Budget 
 
The transit agency’s Accountable Executive is responsible for balancing transit asset 
management, safety, day-to-day operations, and expansion needs in approving and carrying out 
a TAM plan and a PTASP.  The FTA has stated that “when transit agency assets (e.g., vehicles, 
rails, and facilities) are not maintained well, condition deteriorates, maintenance backlogs grow, 
and asset conditions become poor or marginal. The result is decreased safety and reliability, 
increased maintenance costs, and the potential for having to replace assets sooner than would have 
otherwise been necessary”.  SOGR at MBTA has been viewed primarily as a capital renewal 
initiative, and not as performing routine preventative maintenance, which is absolutely necessary 
to keep legacy assets fully functional. 
 
A key priority of the FMCB has been acceleration of capital delivery to reduce the time 
span of bringing the system into a SOGR with emphasis placed on increasing the capital spend 
rate.  The FY20 budget has allocated 80 addition positions to capital delivery.  There have been 
several initiatives to improve capital delivery including administrative reorganization, recruitment 
of additional oversight and project management staff, creation of Capital Delivery and Chief 
Engineer Offices, project management software implementation and project accounting.  This is 
leading to a more robust capital delivery effort.  However, it does not appear that the impact on 
Operations staff to support the CIP has been fully contemplated.  
 
There is widespread concern that focusing predominantly on capital delivery is occurring 
at the expense of the operating needs.  While the agency recognizes the need for additional 
operating personnel and has plans to substantially increase operating staff, it currently takes 100+ 
days to hire a position through a multiple step Human Resources process.  The acceleration of the 
CIP will increase the reliance upon and utilization of Operations staff as it needs to draws assets 
from operating side, i.e. signals, power and flaggers to support its efforts.  There will be no choice 
but to do it through flexing from daily maintenance or through overtime which could exacerbate 
safety related issues, such as fatigue. This circumstance places additional burdens on Operation’s 
staff, who feel that they are already underfunded to perform day-to day tasks.  
 
Several programs have been initiated to bolster capital funding, while having a detrimental 
impact upon operations spending that has been constrained through budgetary actions: 
 
• Pay Go Lockbox:  The balance of funds transferred from operating savings.  This presents a 
double whammy because operations is already underfunded, and any savings should be 
reinvested for those purposes.  Examples of underfunding in Operations are lack of budget for 
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vegetation control and operator support ratio to cover service (in some instances supervisors 
are being used as a back-up to take trains out, Operations instructors having to respond to 
emergencies and run manual blocks). 
• CIP Investments: Every operating dollar saved is invested into the CIP.  That puts pressure on 
the operating budget.  The FY19 budget overview indicated that FMCB targeted $150M annual 
transfer of operating dollars to the CIP.  They stated that deficit spending deprives the CIP of 
that funding.  But it also deprives the operational resources necessary to perform daily 
maintenance. 
• FY20 cost savings initiatives:  HR process takes over 100+ days to hire but the rationale for 
budget cuts in the budget was to eliminate current hire list, eliminate approximately 20% of 
the existing open positions.  Another double whammy on Operations. 
 
There is a huge organizational focus on capital delivery and expansion.  Capital delivery is 
dependent upon resources from M&E.  Expansion of the capital program only increases operating 
budget needs; increasing annually appropriated supplemental funds for capital sets up a conflict 
for Operations and increases the risks of not keeping legacy system assets in a state of good repair. 
 
The assumption is that current capital investment will significantly reduce capital need 
once new assets are in service, but if the daily maintenance is not done, then the system will fall 
back into a state of disrepair. 
 
There are different perspectives in the organization that need to be reconciled to effectively 
coordinate and communicate the strategy.  The top feels that the financial house needs to be in 
order and that the discipline must continue.  The bottom of the organization feels that they are not 
being listened to and that the fiscal cuts have been too deep.  The financial process needs to be 
reexamined to provide efficiencies and flexibility to address the needs of daily operations and the 
capital spending.  Therefore, the leadership of the organization must assess this circumstance and 
strike a balance between delivering the accelerated CIP and maintaining legacy assets that 
contribute to the safety and reliability of the system for riders every day. 
 
IX. Safety Culture 
 
Culture 
 
Today, culture is one of the most discussed subjects of organizational life. It permeates 
every aspect of a business. In its simplest form, culture is defined as the system of behaviors, 
beliefs, norms, and values that shape how work gets done in an organization.  It has been 
determined that an organization’s culture has direct impact on employee/customer safety, 
satisfaction, and business performance. Culture transformation is not an overnight  ‘check the box’ 
activity. Rather, it takes years of dedicated persistence to transform an organization from its current 
state to a healthier more productive future state. The MBTA leadership needs to be intentional 
about the safety culture they want to create and sustain. Conversely, if they choose to do nothing, 
a culture will result by default.  
 
In over 9 hours of dialogue via Focus Groups, the SRP learned much from a diverse set of 
employee disciplines about the MBTA’s culture and how it values safety.  A Focus Group is a 
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form of qualitative research consisting of interviews in which a group of employees are asked to 
share their perceptions, attitudes, and opinions about specific topics within the organization. In 
regards to the MBTA, the questions focused on the MBTA culture specifically as it relates to 
safety, leadership effectiveness, and level of employee engagement. 
 
Our objective was to hear the voice of those on the frontline.  It became apparent to the 
team that the absence of trust and respect, insufficient communications, an increased silo mentality 
resulting in poor teamwork, coupled with inadequately trained leaders are a core contributor to the 
T’s poor safety performance and low morale.  In addition, the severe budget cuts that occurred in 
2016 and 2017 left the organization with a manpower shortage and a brain drain dilemma, with 
much of its industry/institutional knowledge walking out the door.  
 
Sixty-eight percent of the participants gave a grade of C and below regarding the perception 
of how the T views safety, with the average grade being a C. See Appendix D for focus group 
composition and questions. In general, the participants felt that the safety department is more 
reactive than proactive. In addition, outstanding hazards and work order tickets are not responded 
to in a timely manner and are often considered not urgent until an incident happens. Focus group 
members, from the operating departments, shared that there are no longer any requirements for 
safety briefings and there is an inconsistent application of safety discipline.  Support functions 
didn’t see safety as part of their job. 
 
In regards to employee engagement level (on a scale of 1-5), the average rating was 4.2. 
Eighty-six percent of participants feel engaged while they are at work and stated they will give 
their all.  However, a majority of the participants said that once their workday is over, they are 
done. They will not volunteer to assist the organization after normal business hours. Clearly 
employees feel pride in the functions they perform, but also feel frustration with the organization 
they perform it for. 
 
Blame & Retaliation 
 
At the MBTA, the lack of trust with leadership was by far one of the most often cited issues 
from all the groups.  When it comes to safety, employees felt that the organization has created a 
blame and retaliation culture. The impact of this lack of trust, resulting from blame and retaliation, 
has caused employees to stay quiet when they see hazards and unsafe conditions on the property.  
 
Learning from mistakes has proven to be one of the best teaching moments that builds an 
effective safety culture.  It is far more important for leadership to really know what is going on 
within the organization.  When the culture exists where blame always needs to be associated with 
an incident, the result is a lack of trust where employees will avoid self-reporting.   Another 
example is a situation where employees look over their shoulders out of fear that they are being 
monitored and/or being set up.   From a cultural health perspective, when an employee lacks trust 
or is fearful of leadership, they tend to drive important communications underground.  Mistakes 
never get brought to the forefront out of fear of discipline, blame or retaliation.  Employees may 
attempt to keep important information from their supervisors or cover up incidents or facts that are 
critically important for leaders to be aware of.  When a culture like this is prevalent, for every 
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safety related incident that management becomes aware of, it is likely that many events are covered 
up or not reported so as not to gain management’s attention. 
 
Changing Leadership  
 
Much of the work involved in this safety review is deeply rooted in the culture that has 
evolved over time.  Changes in executive leadership will always have a strong impact on whether 
cultures grow, deteriorate, or simply sustain in the current state.  It is important to note that since 
2010 there have been 9 new GMs leading this organization.  Each of these individuals brought to 
the position his or her business priorities, goals, and style.  The agencies accomplishments 
throughout this period relied heavily on the GMs priorities and the political environment that 
guided the organization’s direction.   
 
Additionally, there is no question that the interaction between staff and the FMCB has 
resulted in significant and much needed accomplishments.  However, the FMCB is required by 
legislation to meet 36 times a year.  The preparation, participation and demands placed on staff 
to support these frequent meetings takes an extraordinary toll on agency leadership.  It is 
apparent that staff dedicates an overwhelming amount of their time to this effort, which takes 
them away from their daily responsibilities.  The SRP cannot overstate how detrimental the 
frequency and demands placed on staff to prepare for these meeting are to the overall safety and 
operational performance of the organization. 
 
Talent Acquisition 
 
The MBTA, like other public transit properties, is facing a talent and succession dilemma.  
Pension plans and good healthcare benefits entice people to join the organization and stay until 
they are retirement eligible. During fiscally difficult times, budgets are cut which result in hiring 
and salary freezes. In the case of the MBTA, the hiring freeze and reduction in headcount, was 
exacerbated by the most seasoned and knowledgeable employees accepting management 
sponsored “buy outs” that resulted in significant brain drain.  With no clear succession planning 
or employee development processes in place, the organization finds itself limited in its ability to 
effectively run the system.  Without even realizing it, a safety culture gets formed; unfortunately, 
it is one of poor operational performance and neglect of infrastructure assets. These talent issues 
have attributed to the MBTA’s poor safety culture.  
 
In FY 2017, MBTA’s workforce consisted of 6,547 employees. By FY 2018, it reached an 
all-time 4 year-low of 5,643 employees. Recognizing that they cut too close to the bone, the T is 
slowly regaining the necessary staff needed to provide service and meet its business needs. As of 
June 30, 2019, the T has 6,198 employees. Another issue that impedes talent acquisition is the 
lengthy hiring process of more than 100 days. It should be noted that the MBTA is currently 
working at reducing this timeframe.  Recently, as part of a shared service with the Massachusetts 
Department of Transportation (MASSDOT), the T will utilize Cornerstone, a succession planning 
and management software tool and begin to build a cadre of leadership talent.  
 
Additionally, in the past year, the MBTA has been extraordinarily successful attracting top 
talent at the highest levels of the organization from some of the country’s finest schools.  The SRP 
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met with the newly hired senior leaders and recognized their energy and passion to meet the 
challenges that the T currently faces.  However, the transit industry is a complicated business. The 
limited transit experience of the new talent impedes their ability to ‘see around corners’ in such a 
complex system. Onboarding concerns will be discussed below in the Internal Communication 
section. 
 
The agency has not performed well in terms of leading for safety or in utilizing this talent 
to set a firm foundation to guide the organization’s path for safety.  There is a lack of clarity and 
alignment around safety leadership.  This new leadership team must recognize that the talents they 
bring to the table will become of greater value when they go out in the field to listen and learn 
from the employees who have been part of the T for years. 
 
Managerial Communication 
 
Each of the focus groups shared their thoughts about the managers who have been working 
at the T for a while. It was clear to the SRP that existing managers lack the communication skills 
to create a strong safety culture. Frontline employees feel that their thoughts and ideas are rarely, 
if ever, sought after, and more often than not, completely dismissed. From the stories shared with 
the panel, there is a lack of consistent and thoughtful managerial training and development.  
 
However, the T recently began a collaborative management development effort with 
Roxbury Community College to build managerial skills and talent. The inability of supervisors to 
give constructive feedback was evident as the participants shared their everyday frustrations on 
how they were spoken to. The pay inequity to move to a managerial title was also discussed with 
the operating focus groups.  There is no incentive to become a manager since an employee can 
earn substantially more than his/her supervisor by working overtime.  It should be noted that this 
is an industry-wide issue for many public transit properties. 
 
Teamwork  
 
Teamwork is constantly talked about in organizational life.  It is not just a concept; rather, 
it is a strategic choice.  At the kickoff meeting (July 2019) with the senior leaders, two questions 
were asked.  What is the strength of the T and what do you see as a development opportunity?  
Most members of the leadership believe that the T’s ability to handle crisis is their strength. 
However, the creation of departmental silos and poor internal communications was most often 
cited as an area that the organization needs to improve. 
 
Much of the discussion across the six Focus groups also centered on siloes and the lack of 
communication between leaders, managers, and the frontline.  Focus group participants validated 
their senior leadership concerns, stating that it is hard to hold people accountable because there is 
a lack of clarity on what people do.  In general, they feel that the culture struggles with defining 
who their internal customer is and that there is a lack of cooperation among departments. 
 
Internal Communications 
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Through many individual and focus group discussions, the SRP heard much dismay about 
the MBTA’s lack of onboarding practices for new hires. While HR does conduct the usual benefits 
and forms completion rituals, new hires from the executive level to the frontline talked about 
‘fending for themselves’ when it came to learning about their role, responsibilities, the T culture, 
and what it values. By virtue of the roles, frontline employees have a greater exposure to the 
operations and safety, i.e. they must receive ROW and technical training, which improves their 
understanding of the organization.  However, for employees who are hired in back office functions, 
the word safety is rarely if ever discussed during those beginning days. In fact, non-operating focus 
group participants, more often than not, mentioned that safety is really not part of their job since 
they do not work in the operations. 
 
Additionally, throughout the focus group discussions, facilitators heard employees state 
that organization charts were non-existent; therefore, they had to create their own charts to gain a 
better understanding of who works where and what different functions are performed. As a result 
of inconsistent onboarding practices, new hires have established a creative approach to learning 
about MBTA.  One example is to meet personnel from another department at their location to get 
a better visual sense and understanding of the operation.  The onboarding process in another area 
that presents the opportunity for benchmarking.  Many transit agencies have comprehensive new 
employee orientation programs that requires employees at all levels to jointly attend. 
 
Conclusion - Creating a New Normal 
 
In an organization with a healthy culture that supports safety, several attributes will always 
be visible and center to all actions and challenges.  First, at the core would be a stated vision and 
mission, with clearly defined values and strategies that bring the mission to life. There would also 
be defined behaviors that would guide all employees to follow.  It must be clear that leadership 
owns culture, and the leadership’s daily actions will continue to define the culture.  In essence, 
what they resource, what they emphasize, how they treat employees and customers, and what they 
celebrate and show value for, far outweighs any written strategies, verbal statements or posters on 
the wall.   
 
The MBTA is at a critical junction in its history.  The Chairman, FMCB and the GM have 
all acknowledged that the culture of the T must change to meet the needs of its riding public and 
the employees who move the system. Establishing a culture of safety is not an option, rather, it has 
become a necessity.  They recognize that to move the organization to a place where safety is a 
priority and is culturally integrated into every aspect of their mission, the leadership team must be 
clear and aligned on what their goals are, the strategies they need to establish to get there, and 
determine how they will align themselves to work together to build a new normal—a culture that 
places safety as a foundational value for its employees and customers all day, every day. 
 
X. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The SRP is providing 34 recommendations, which contain 61 individual corrective actions that 
the Panel believes will set the agency on the path toward implementing a more effective SMS 
approach to safety and decrease the frequency and severity of organizational accidents. 
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SMS Discussion: 
 
Issue:  The MBTA is experiencing a number of accidents and operational incidents, which can 
be directly attributed to their current SMS practices not achieving effective outcomes. 
 
Safety Policy Findings  Safety Policy Recommendations Page 
Safety Policy Finding 1: MBTA 
management does not have 
defined safety objectives, safety 
performance  targets and safety 
performance indicators. This 
circumstance has made 
executive leadership and the 
FMCB “blind” to 
organizational risk. 
 
Effective PMI programs, as well 
as QA/QC activities, are the 
agency’s primary defenses 
against operational incidents.  
Intense concentration on these 
activities should be one of the 
central focuses of an accident 
investigation. More importantly, 
simply performing required 
PMIs and having effective 
QA/QC programs will 
dramatically reduce operational 
incidents. 
 
Safety Policy Recommendation 1a: MBTA 
management must establish safety objectives, 
safety performance targets and safety performance 
indicators.  These metrics should include both 
operations and safety targets, i.e. derailments, 
collision, efficiency testing, training, employee 
and customer injury data as well as compliance 
rates with PMIs activities for each department and 
other key performance data as determined by 
senior management. 
 
Safety Policy Recommendation 1b: The 
establishment of PMI safety performance targets  
and safety performance indicators must ensure that 
these activities: 
• are aligned with industry best practices, 
• are occurring at the required frequency 
• are monitored to ensure they have not been 
inappropriately suspended or discontinued, 
• are monitored to ensure required mid-life or 
other critical system overhauls are conducted, 
• have sufficient human capital to be carried out, 
• are properly funded. 
 
SMS Safety Policy Recommendation 1c: Once the 
above metrics are established, the safety 
objectives, performance targets and indicators 
must be formally communicated by MBTA 
management throughout the agency (as 
appropriate), reviewed and periodically updated, 
and used to inform the allocation of resources. 
 
SMS Safety Policy Recommendation 1d: MBTA 
must establish effective organization-wide QA/QC 
programs. 
 
4-6 
8, 11, 
12-13, 
14, 23, 
26, 27, 
30, 
Safety Policy Finding 2: A 
select portion of PMIs activities 
Safety Policy Recommendation 2: MBTA 
management must identify and correct all areas 
where deferred maintenance is occurring. 
5 
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were intentionally suspended on 
the transit side of the agency. 
 
 
Safety Policy Finding 3: There 
is little or no data to support 
what PMIs are required, or what 
has been accomplished. 
 
 
 
Safety Policy Recommendation 3: MBTA 
management must ensure that sufficient resources 
are directed toward expediating the 
implementation of data collection systems, to 
include, but not be limited to all MOW 
departments, training and medical departments. 
 
4, 5, 
10,  
Safety Policy Finding 4: Keolis 
is performing well.  The Panel 
attributes this higher level of 
performance to the structure 
provided by FRA regulations.  
Safety Policy Recommendation 4: MBTA should 
evaluate adopting FRA standards on the transit 
side of the operation, where appropriate, to 
provide guidance the workforce and ensure 
accepted industry minimum standards are 
followed. 
 
5-6 
Safety Policy Finding 5: 
Individuals on the FMCB, 
individuals in MBTA executive  
leadership roles and many 
senior leaders do not have 
“hands-on” transit operations 
and safety experience, which 
are the core functions of the 
organization. 
 
 
Safety Policy Recommendation 5a: MBTA must 
provide direct mentoring and coaching to 
individuals in executive leadership roles to make 
them more effective. 
 
Safety Policy Recommendation 5b: MBTA must 
build a leadership team that contains seasoned 
transit professionals with operations and safety 
expertise and experience. 
 
Safety Policy Recommendation 5c: The FMCB 
should evaluate adding individuals with operations 
and safety skillsets to their ranks to provide a more 
holistic approach to overseeing the MBTA. 
 
7, 26 
Safety Policy Finding 6: The 
leadership on the mass transit 
side of the house, appears to be 
extremely distracted by 
preparing for FMCB meetings, 
which are mandated to occur 36 
times a year.  This dynamic is 
clearly affecting the operational 
and safety performance of the 
organization. 
 
Safety Policy Recommendation 6: MBTA and 
FMCB leaders should take measures to reduce the 
required frequency of Board meetings, i.e. petition 
the MA. legislature for relief.  If this is not 
feasible, identify other methods of making the 
meetings less burdensome on senior MBTA staff. 
6, 34 
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Safety Risk Management  
Findings 
Safety Risk Management Recommendations Page 
Safety Risk Management 
Finding 1: The CAPs being 
produced by MBTA transit 
management are not 
achieving the level of safety 
improvement needed at the 
organization. 
 
Safety Risk Managment Recommendation 1: The 
agency should formally adopt the recommendations 
made in this report and track them to closure. 
8, 11 
Safety Risk Management 
Finding 2: The rapid closure 
of CAP action items does not 
provide sufficient time for 
staff to monitor that these 
activities are being 
repetitively performed. In 
addition, the CAPs are not 
being sufficiently audited and 
analyzed  to evaluate whether 
they are effective.  
 
CAPs that are not achieving 
the intended outcomes are not 
being sent back through the 
Safety Risk Managment 
process to be re-evaluated 
and revised. 
 
Safety Risk Managment Recommendation 2a: The 
Safety department should evaluate recently “closed” 
CAPs to determine if they were prematurely closed 
without a sufficient level of verification and 
auditing.  
 
Safety Risk Management Recommendation 2b: Once 
the analysis described above is completed, determine 
if any CAPs need to be reopened, revised and 
reissued.  
 
Safety Risk Management Recommendation 2c: 
MBTA should evaluate and revise their current CAP 
procedures to ensure that it: 
• requires data analysis over a sufficient period of 
time to verify implementation and that required 
actions are occurring on an ongoing basis 
• perform data analysis to determine if additional 
actions are required 
• audits the results of the mitigation to confirm that 
the desired results are being achieved 
• re-evaluate mitigations, if positive results are not 
achieved 
• defines the global strategy for addressing the 
specific risk at the agency 
• ensures that CAPs are not closed until all 
elements are satisfied. 
 
9-10 
15 
Safety Risk Management 
Finding 3: MBTA is insular 
and does not optimally take 
advantage of benchmarking 
opportunities.  
 
Safety Risk Management Finding 3a: MBTA should 
benchmark their existing practices to include, but be 
limited to, rule compliance testing programs, 
employee safety reporting systems, accident 
investigations, PMIs, QA/QC activities and 
ROW/RWP training.  This can be achieved via peer-
to-peer discussions, comparison to FRA regulations 
and APTA peer reviews as some examples. 
5, 10, 
23, 26, 
36 
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Safety Risk Management Finding 3b: MBTA must 
adopt and implement best practices identified via 
benchmarking activities. 
 
Safety Risk Management 
Finding 3: Contractors 
performing safety sensitive 
functions, such as operating 
work equipment rail vehicles, 
are not part of Transit’s 
Fatigue Risk Management 
Program. 
 
Keolis lacks an OSA 
screening program.  
 
Safety Risk Management Recommendation 4a: 
MBTA should evaluate requiring contractors, who 
perform safety sensitive functions such as operating 
work equipment, to comply with the T’s FRMP 
standards.  
 
Safety Risk Management Recommendation 4b: 
MBTA must ensure that the OSA screening program 
and other appropriate measures to combat fatigue on 
the commuter rail operation are implemented.  
 
11 
Safety Risk Management 
Finding 4: Many recent 
incidents had vehicle and 
track related defects as causal 
factors in these events.  
Therefore, the Panel 
requested third-party SMEs 
perform an assessment. 
 
There may be other key 
legacy assets that should be 
independently evaluated to 
determine their functionality 
such as Fire/Life/Safety, 
Ventilation and Drainage 
assets. 
 
Safety Risk Management Recommendation 5a: 
MBTA management must evaluate and implement as 
appropriate, the findings of the third-party 
consultants assessing the Track and Vehicle 
maintenance areas, with immediate emphasis on 
QA/QC functions. 
 
Safety Risk Management Recommendation 5b: 
MBTA shall ensure that the appropriate level of 
resources are made available to correct the defects 
identified by the external SMEs in a timely manner. 
 
Safety Risk Management Recommendation 5c: 
MBTA must evaluate if other key legacy asset 
system need third-party SME inspections, such as 
Fire/Life/Safety, Ventilation and Drainage assets.  
 
11-14 
Safety Risk Management 
Finding 5: The SRP believes 
that there is reluctance on the 
part of vehicle maintenance 
personnel to continue putting 
the needed level of resources 
into maintaining the older 
fleet of cars, as they are 
scheduled to be retired in the 
near future. 
 
Safety Risk Management Recommendation 6: 
MBTA must continue to maintain rail cars to agency 
standards as long as the vehicles are used in 
passenger service. 
12 
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Safety Assurance Findings Safety Assurance Recommendations Page 
Safety Assurance Finding 1: 
MBTA operations and safety 
management do not have a 
sufficient presence in the 
field; therefore, they are not 
adequately monitoring 
regular operations. 
 
Safety Assurance Recommendation 1: MBTA 
executive management should establish methods to 
increase opportunities for leadership to spend more 
time in the field, i.e. “No meetings days”, joint 
management & union audits, performance reviews 
with managerial engagements with frontline 
employees as a metric, mandate weekly field time 
for all managers and supervisors. 
 
15-18 
Safety Assurance Finding 2: 
The current culture of blame 
and retaliation at the 
MBTA’s transit operation is 
impeding the T’s ability to 
achieve a greater level of 
risk management. 
 
Safety Assurance Recommendation 2a: MBTA 
management should evaluate adopting a third party 
employee safety reporting system, i.e. C3RS or the 
BTS system. 
 
Safety Assurance Recommendation 2b: MBTA 
management must actively encourage employees to 
report safety concerns and promote existing and 
future employee safety reporting systems. 
 
Safety Assurance Recommendation 2c: MBTA 
management must implement mechanisms to provide 
feedback to employees on actions that have been 
taking in response to reported safety concerns. 
 
6, 18, 
19, 21, 
22, 26, 
34 
Safety Assurance Finding 3: 
The Safety department 
cannot lead an independent, 
comprehensive accident 
investigation due to a lack of 
Subject Matter Experts.  This 
inadequacy is even more 
pronounced for events 
centered around Mechanical 
& Engineering issues.  
 
Safety Assurance Recommendation 3: The Safety 
department is pursuing resources to address the SME 
finding.  The Safety department must provide 
executive leadership with periodic updates on this 
activity (headcount and ZBB issues will be discussed 
in the Financial recommendation section). 
19-23 
Safety Assurance Finding 4: 
Design modifications have 
occurred without regimented 
safety certification being 
conducted.  This 
circumstance is due to the 
operating departments not 
involving the Safety 
department in day-to-day 
activities. 
Safety Assurance Recommendation 4: MBTA 
management must ensure that all management is 
aware of safety certification requirements.  This can 
be achieved via SMS training, operational bulletins, 
and “Lessons Learned” bulletins, as some examples. 
22 
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Safety Assurance Finding 5: 
There does not appear to 
clear lines of supervision for 
motor-persons. 
 
It is not evident that “ride 
checks” that gauge the 
caliber of employee’s 
performance is being 
conducted on motor-persons. 
This action is especially 
critical for new motor-
persons. 
 
Motor-person training 
should be evaluated to 
ensure employees fully 
understand the requirements 
of their job as well as the 
consequences of their 
actions. 
 
Safety Assurance Recommendation 5a: MBTA 
management must establish clear lines of reporting 
for motor-persons and their immediate supervisors. 
 
Safety Assurance Recommendation 5b: MBTA 
management must establish a defined frequency for 
motor-person read checks and give feedback to 
employees.  
 
Safety Assurance Recommendation 5c: MBTA 
manage must establish and monitor safety 
performance and safety performance indicators for 
this activity.    
 
Safety Assurance Recommendation 5d: MBTA 
management must evaluate the current Motor-person 
training to ensure employees are adequately trained 
on their duties and understand the consequences of 
their actions, such as over-speeding as one example. 
15 
 
 
Safety Promotion Findings Safety Promotion Recommendations Page 
Safety Promotion Finding 1: 
The MBTA transit training 
function is decentralized 
which creates internal 
oversight issues regarding 
assessing the consistency and 
caliber of the training that is 
being delivered.  
 
Safety Promotion Recommendation 1: MBTA must 
evaluate centralizing training to ensure consistency 
and caliber of training being delivered. 
23-24 
Safety Promotion Finding 2: 
The volume of students 
attending RWP training 
created time management 
challenges for the instructor, 
which resulted in key training 
areas being glossed over or 
were not covered at all.  
 
Safety Promotion Recommendation 2: Training 
management must establish and enforce manageable 
maximum class sizes (issues regarding headcounts 
and ZBB will be covered in the Financial 
recommendations below). 
24 
Safety Promotion Finding 3:  Safety Promotion Recommendation 3: MBTA 
Training management should routinely audit training 
24-25 
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The instructor wrote the 
answers to the five questions 
regarding the bus safety 
curriculum on the chalkboard 
for the class to use on the 
final exam. This act improved 
the student’s odds of passing 
the course and receiving a 
ROW certification card.   
 
The speed in which critical 
material was covered raises 
concerns that novices to the 
transit industry may not have 
absorbed enough working 
knowledge to recognize a 
ROW procedural error or that 
they will have the confidence 
to invoke a Good Faith 
Challenge. 
 
classes to be aware of and identify these types of 
deviations in training protocols and develop CAPs to 
address. 
Safety Promotion Finding 4:  
Training manuals are printed 
in Black and White; however, 
the different colored flags in 
the curriculum are not labeled 
by color. 
 
Safety Promotion Recommendation 4: MBTA must 
either resume printing color training manuals or 
update the current manuals to provide color coded 
labeling where applicable. 
25 
Safety Promotion Finding 5: 
There does not appear to be 
clearly defined PPE standards 
that are understood across the 
organization. 
 
 
 
Safety Promotion Recommendation 5a: MBTA 
needs to define their minimum standards for ROW 
PPE, communicate the standards to the workforce 
and enforce them. 
 
Safety Promotion Recommendation 5b: MBTA 
needs to perform a critical assessment of employee 
safety needs beyond ROW PPE, i.e. harnesses for 
fall protection, PPE for Hot Work, as some 
examples. 
 
25 
Safety Promotion Finding 6: 
While the MBTA is making 
progress in implementing 
SMS, there is clearly a need 
for further improvement in 
the many areas described 
throughout this report.  
Safety Promotion Recommendation 6a: MBTA must 
conduct an organization-wide SMS gap analysis to 
determine the agency’s current SMS maturity level. 
 
Safety Promotion Recommendation 6b: The SMS 
gap analysis of the Safety department should receive 
27-28 
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priority as they are instrumental in the 
implementation of the agency’s SMS program.  
 
 
Financial Review Discussion: 
 
Issue: Delivery of the Capital budget has become the backbone of the strategic and tactical 
planning for the agency, while insufficient attention is paid to day-to-day PMIs and maintaining 
the full functionality of legacy assets.   
 
Financial Review Findings Financial Review Recommendations Page 
Financial Review Finding 1: 
The FMCB strategic plan is 
overly focused on delivering 
the Capital budget. While the 
plan mentions that “asset 
management and life-cycle 
maintenance are the keys to 
ensuring that the MBTA’s 
asset never again fall into 
disrepair”, there are no 
metrics measuring the 
performance of preventative 
maintenance.   
 
Financial Review Recommendation 1: FMCB must 
require MBTA leadership to provide and publicly 
report on KPIs associated with PMIs and the 
performance of required maintenance of legacy 
system assets to keep them fully functional. 
14, 26, 
30, 32, 
33 
Financial Review Finding 2: 
Deep budget reductions have 
resulted in the lack of 
resources in critical areas, 
which may be affecting the 
safe delivery of services.   
 
The reductions appear to have 
occurred as a totally top 
down approach without a 
critical or clear assessment of 
functions or needs. 
 
Financial Review Recommendation 2a: MBTA must 
perform a ZBB analysis of each department to 
identify the appropriate level of resources needed to 
ensure the safe delivery of service and support core 
business functions. 
 
Financial Review Recommendation 2b: MBTA must 
avoid a top down approach to conducting the ZBB 
and have an inclusive dialogue with those directly 
impacted by these decisions. 
 
 
24, 31 
Financial Review Finding 3: 
A key priority of the FMCB 
has been acceleration of 
capital delivery. 
 
This is a major initiative that 
has a significant impact upon 
the operating budget.  There 
Financial Review Recommendation 3: MBTA must 
re-examine the financial process to provide 
efficiencies and flexibility to address the needs of 
daily operations and the capital spending.   
 
 
 
29, 32 
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is widespread concern about 
the resource focus on capital 
delivery is occurring at the 
expense of the operating 
needs.   
 
 
Safety Culture Discussion:  
 
Issue: The present leadership team is not providing the clarity and alignment necessary to build a 
new safety culture at the MBTA. 
 
Safety Culture Findings Safety Culture Recommendations Page 
Safety Culture Finding 1: The 
agency has not performed 
well in terms of leading for 
safety or in utilizing its 
internal talent to set a firm 
foundation to guide the 
organization’s path for safety.   
 
There is a lack of clarity and 
alignment around safety 
leadership. 
 
Safety Culture Recommendation 1a: MBTA must be 
intentional about the culture they want to establish 
and start by defining the organization’s vision, 
mission, values, strategies and associated behaviors. 
 
Safety Culture Recommendation 1b: MBTA must 
update managerial job descriptions to include 
performance criteria to create ownership and 
accountability for driving a culture of safety. 
 
Safety Culture Recommendation 1c: MBTA must 
create a feedback loop for discussing performance 
around safety. 
 
Safety Culture Recommendation 1d: MBTA must 
define leadership safety involvement and 
expectations. 
 
Safety Culture Recommendation 1e: MBTA must  
hold monthly Executive Safety meetings at the 
executive level and cascade information down 
through the organization.  
 
3, 4, 
27, 29, 
33, 34, 
35 
Safety Culture Finding 2:  
The absence of trust and 
respect, insufficient 
communications, an 
increased silo mentality 
resulting in poor teamwork, 
coupled with inadequately 
trained leaders are at the core 
of the T’s poor safety 
performance and low morale. 
Safety Culture Recommendation 2a: MBTA must 
utilize its affiliation with Roxbury Community 
College to train managers to its fullest.   
 
Safety Culture Recommendation 2b: Establish 
feedback mechanisms that help leaders learn 
effective communication skills. Provide one on one 
and/or team coaching to guide leaders. 
6, 7, 
19, 26, 
33, 34, 
36 
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Managers and supervisors 
need to improve basic 
leadership skills.  
 
Leaders do not spend enough 
time in the field engaging 
with frontline personnel. And 
when they do, they exhibit 
poor listening and feedback 
skills. 
 
Safety Culture Finding 3:  
From senior management to 
the frontline—the agency has 
created a silo mentality and 
does not seek or share 
information to achieve its 
goals. 
 
Safety Culture Recommendation 3 MBTA needs to 
create cross-functional teams with specific goals to 
achieve strategic plans and breakdown siloes. 
6, 33, 
36 
Safety Culture Finding 4:  
There is not an adequate 
onboarding process from both 
the organizational and 
departmental level.  
 
Safety Culture Recommendation 4a: MBTA must 
benchmark its onboarding process against other 
transit agencies. 
 
Safety Culture Recommendation 4b: MBTA must 
create an onboarding program for both operating and 
support functions.  The onboarding process should 
include safety information that will guide new hire 
understanding of safety as a value by clarifying its 
importance in every aspect of MBTA business.   
 
Safety Culture Recommendation 4b: Organize and 
encourage site visits in the first 100 days to help new 
hires gain a better understanding of how the T works 
together to achieve its mission. 
 
4, 35, 
36 
Safety Culture Finding 5: The 
MBTA lacks formal 
organization charts. 
 
 
Safety Culture Recommendation 5: MBTA needs to 
build and continuously update organization charts to 
help employees learn who, what and how the 
organization achieves its daily mission. 
 
31, 36 
Safety Culture Finding 6: 
The agency lacks a multi- 
vehicle approach to 
communicating with 
employees. 
Safety Culture Recommendation 6a: MBTA must 
look at and implement a diverse strategies to 
communicate with its employees to build  “esprit de 
corps”.  
 
4, 6-7, 
26, 27, 
31, 33, 
34, 35, 
36 
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Safety Culture Recommendation 6b: MBTA should 
create events that make employees feel appreciated 
and valued. 
 
Safety Culture Finding 7: 
There is no incentive to 
become a manager since an 
employee can earn 
substantially more than 
his/her supervisor by working 
overtime. 
 
Safety Culture Recommendation 7:  MBTA must 
conduct an equity analysis to attract and retain 
quality management and non-operations personnel, 
such as Safety Officers. 
36 
Safety Culture Finding 8: 
The MBTA is at a critical 
junction in its history.  The 
Chairman, FMCB and the 
GM have all acknowledged 
that the culture of the T must 
change to meet the needs of 
its riding public and the 
employees who move the 
system. Establishing a culture 
of safety is not an option, 
rather, it has become a 
necessity.   
 
Safety Culture Recommendation 8:  MBTA should 
evaluate inviting the SRP back after a period of time 
has elapsed to gauge the progress of implementing 
these recommendations. 
37 
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Appendix A 
 
Safety Review Panel Biographies 
 
 
 
 
 
Ray LaHood 
 
Ray LaHood is a former U.S. Department of Transportation Secretary. 
 
With a 36-year career in public service, Secretary LaHood has extensive experience on major 
national policy issues, among them transportation and infrastructure.  He served as the 16th 
Department of Transportation Secretary from 2009 to 2013 and quickly became known as a 
bipartisan leader and skilled conciliator in a highly partisan environment. 
 
Secretary LaHood’s tenure was marked by landmark effort to improve safety in every mode of 
transportation, from aviation and rail to pipelines and automobiles. Under his leadership, 
improvements to America’s infrastructure included building or replacing 350,000 miles if 
highway, repairing 20,000 bridges sand renewing or constructing 6,000 miles of rail track. 
Secretary LaHood also achieved more stringent fuel efficiency requirements from automakers, 
took steps to address airline pilot fatigue and turned the problem of distracted driving into a 
national concern.  As Secretary of Transportation, he oversaw an agency with more than 55,000 
employees and a US$70 billion budget in charge of air, maritime, and surface transportation.  
 
Before heading the US Department of Transportation, Secretary LaHood served from 1995 to 
2009 in the US House of Representatives on behalf of the 18th District of Illinois and also served 
on various House committees, among them the powerful House Appropriations Committee and 
the House Intelligence Committee.  He served as chief of staff to US House Minority Leader 
Robert Michel from 1982 to 1994. He was director of Rock Island County Youth Service Bureau 
from 1972 to 1974; chief planner of the Bi-States Metropolitan Planning Commission from 1974 
to 1977; and district administrative assistant for US Congressman Tom Railsback from 1977 to 
1982. 
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Carolyn Flowers, Managing Principal , lnfraStrategies LLC 
CAROLYN FLOWERS 
Carolyn Flowers joined lnfraStrategies LLC as Managing Principal in February 2019. lnfraStrategies is a 
global consultancy providing advisory, advocacy and management services to public authorities and private 
organizations in the infrastructure space. 
Carolyn's prior role was as Senior Vice President, Americas Transit Market Sector Leader at AECOM with the 
responsibility for client and industry relations and coordinating business development in United States and 
Canada. Prior to that Carolyn spent two years at the Federal Transit Administration as Senior Advisor and in 
the last nine months of her tenure she served as the Acting Administrator. From 2010 to 2015 she served as 
Chief Executive Officer/Director of Public Transit for Charlotte Area Transit System (CATS), with responsibility 
for county-wide bus and rail transit planning and management. 
Prior to joining the City of Charlotte, Flowers was Chief Operations Officer for Los Angeles County 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) and responsible for managing bus operations and Freeway 
Service Patrol. In all, she spent nineteen years at MTA in a number of positions in budget and operations. 
She received a bachelor's degree in History and Political Science and a master's degree in Business 
Administration from the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) School of Management. 
Flowers is currently serving on the American Public Transportation Association's (APTA) Board of 
Directors. She previously served as Co-Chair Reauthorization Task Force. She is a member of APT A's 
Publication Advisory, Leadership, Legislative, and Awards committees. She also served on the Board of 
Directors for the North American Transit Services Association (NATSA) and the Transit Cooperative 
Research Program (TCRP) Oversight and Project Selection. She is a also serving on the Board of the 
Women's Transportation Seminar and the Eno Foundation. In addition, she is a member of Conference of 
Minority Transportation Officials (COMTO). 
In 2007, she was recognized as the Tom Bradley Alumnus of the Year by the UCLA Black Alumni 
Association. The award is named for the first African-American Mayor of Los Angeles, a champion of public 
transportation for Los Angeles County. In 2008, she was named Woman of the Year by the Los Angeles 
Chapter of the Women's Transportation Seminar. She also received the Ambassador award for her volunteer 
work with the American Stroke Association and was given a special recognition award by the Greater Los 
Angeles African- American Chamber of Commerce. She was named by UCLA Anderson School of Business 
as one of 75 most Inspirational graduates in their first 100 years. She was also 2018 recipient of the Friends 
of Eno Award from the Eno Foundation. 
Flowers is a graduate of the 2003 APT A Transportation Leadership Class. She participated in a 2005 
international study project for the National Association of Sciences, sponsored by the Eno Foundation for 
Transportation Studies, as well as the executive development program sponsored by the Eno Center for 
Transit Leadership. She has served on Johnson C. Smith University Board of Visitors, the Foundation for the 
Carolinas Charlotte-Mecklenburg Fund Board of Directors, the Institute for Transportation Research and 
Education (ITRE) Board and the Women's lntercultural Exchange (V\IIE) Advisory Council. 
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Carmen Bianco 
Carmen Bianco is the principal at Bianco Associates. His 
work on organizational culture and business 
performance spans the globe. 
For nearly six years, Carmen Bianco oversaw the 
operation of New York City Transit, North America's 
largest mass transit system. 
As president of the subway and bus systems, he was 
responsible for the safe and efficient transportation of New York City Transit's 
nearly eight million daily customers. Bianco directed a workforce of more than 
48,000 employees and an annual operating budget that exceeded $10 billion. 
During his tenure, Bianco transformed the agency's organizational culture to align 
management strategies, enhance safety and improve customer service to advance 
the subways, buses, paratransit and Staten Island Railway in New York City. 
Bianco and his team guided the agency through significant snowstorms, Hurricane 
Irene and Superstorm Sandy, which took a critical toll on significant areas of the 
110-year-old infrastructure. Despite more than $4 billion in Sandy-related damage, 
Bianco and his team restored 80 percent of subway service within five days. 
As New York City Transit worked to deliver consistent service to daily ridership that 
has steadily expanded to more than 8.2 million people, Bianco lead his team to plan 
service for the future by evaluating ways to deliver higher-capacity, more 
environmentally friendly and technologically advanced trains and buses and 
improved levels of customer service. 
Bianco joined NYCT with 33 years of experience in corporate safety, loss control and 
transportation operations. He worked in key leadership positions at Amtrak for 
more than 17 years and served as New York City Transit's assistant vice president of 
system safety between 1991-1995. 
For a decade, Bianco worked with DuPont and BST, two of the most highly sought 
consulting firms, advising international business leaders from Fortune 100 and 500 
firms on organizational culture change to support operational excellence. 
In his consulting, Carmen advises corporations on issues involving leadership, 
culture, strategy and operational practices. In addition to being an advisor to several 
CEOs, Carmen has an extensive list of senior executives who continue to use his 
skills and experiences as a senior executive and professional coach. 
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Appendix B 
 
Safety Management System General Requirements 
 
SMS General requirements 
 
49 CFR Part 673 requires that each transit agency must establish and implement a SMS. A 
transit agency SMS must be appropriately scaled to the size, scope and complexity of transit 
agency and include the following elements: 
 
Safety Policy 
Safety Risk Management 
Safety Assurance 
Safety Promotion 
 
Safety Policy 
 
• A transit agency must establish its organizational accountabilities and responsibilities and 
have a written statement of safety management policy that includes the agency’s safety 
objectives and safety performance targets. 
• A transit agency must establish a process that allows employees to report safety conditions 
to senior management, protections for employees who report safety conditions to senior 
management, and a description of employee behaviors that may result in disciplinary 
action. 
• The safety management policy must be communicated throughout the agency’s 
organization. 
• The transit agency must establish the necessary authorities, accountabilities, and 
responsibilities for the management of safety amongst the following individuals within its 
organization, as they relate to the development and management of the transit agency’s 
SMS: 
o Accountable Executive. The transit agency must identify an Accountable 
Executive. The Accountable Executive is accountable for ensuring that the 
agency’s SMS is effectively implemented, throughout the agency’s public 
transportation system. The Accountable Executive is accountable for ensuring 
action is taken, as necessary, to address substandard performance in the 
agency’s SMS. The Accountable Executive may delegate specific 
responsibilities, but the ultimate accountability for the transit agency’s safety 
performance cannot be delegated and always rests with the Accountable 
Executive. 
o Chief Safety Officer or SMS Executive. The Accountable Executive may designate 
a Chief Safety Officer or SMS Executive who may be given authority and 
responsibility for day-to-day implementation and operation of an agency’s SMS. 
The Chief Safety Officer or SMS Executive must hold a direct line of reporting to 
the Accountable Executive. A transit agency may allow the Accountable Executive 
to also serve as the Chief Safety Officer or SMS Executive. 
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o Agency leadership and executive management. A transit agency must identify those 
members of its leadership or executive management, other than an Accountable 
Executive, Safety Officer, or SMS Executive, who have authorities or 
responsibilities for day-to-day implementation and operation of an agency’s SMS. 
o Key staff. A transit agency may designate key staff, groups of staff, or 
committees to support the Accountable Executive, Chief Safety Officer, or 
SMS Executive in developing, implementing, and operating the agency’s SMS. 
 
Safety Risk Management 
 
• Safety Risk Management process. A transit agency must develop and implement a 
Safety Risk Management process for all elements of its public transportation system. 
The Safety Risk Management process must be comprised of the following activities: 
Identification of safety hazards, analysis of safety hazards, safety risk evaluation, and 
safety risk mitigation. 
• Safety hazard identification and analysis. 
1. A transit agency must establish a process for hazard identification and analysis. 
2. A transit agency must include, as a source for hazard identification and analysis, 
data, and information provided by an oversight authority and the FTA. 
• Safety risk evaluation and mitigation. 
o A transit agency must establish activities to evaluate and prioritize the safety risk 
associated with the potential consequences of safety hazards. Safety risks must be 
evaluated in terms of probability and severity and take into account mitigations 
already in place to reduce the probability or severity of the potential consequence(s) 
analyzed. 
o A transit agency must establish criteria for the development of safety risk 
mitigations that are necessary based on the results of the agency’s safety risk 
evaluation. 
 
Safety Assurance 
 
• Safety assurance process. A transit agency must develop and implement a safety 
assurance process, consistent with this subpart. 
• Safety performance monitoring and measurement. A transit agency must establish 
activities to:  
o Monitor its system for compliance with, and sufficiency of, the agency’s 
procedures for operations and maintenance; 
o Monitor its operations to identify hazards not identified through the Safety Risk 
Management process. 
o Monitor its operations to identify any safety risk mitigations that may be 
ineffective, inappropriate, or were not implemented as intended; 
o Investigate safety events to identify causal factors; and 
o Monitor information reported through any internal safety reporting programs. 
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• Management of change. 
o A transit agency must establish a process for identifying and assessing changes that 
may introduce new hazards or impact the transit agency’s safety performance. 
o If a transit agency determines that a change may impact its safety performance, 
then the transit agency must evaluate the proposed change through its Safety Risk 
Management process. 
• Continuous improvement. 
o A transit agency must establish a process to assess its safety performance. 
o If a transit agency identifies any deficiencies as part of its safety performance 
assessment, then the transit agency must develop and carry out, under the direction 
of the Accountable Executive, a plan to address the identified safety deficiencies. 
 
Safety Promotion 
 
• Competencies and training.  A transit agency must establish a comprehensive safety 
training program for all agency employees and contractors directly responsible for the 
management of safety in the agency’s public transportation system. The training program 
must include refresher training, as necessary. 
• Safety communication. A transit agency must communicate safety and safety performance 
information throughout the agency’s organization that, at a minimum, conveys 
information on hazards and safety risks relevant to employees’ roles and responsibilities 
and informs employees of safety actions taken in response to reports submitted through an 
employee safety reporting program. 
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Appendix C 
 
List of Interviewees 
 
Position Title 
FMCB Members FMCB Chair 
FMCB Members FMCB Vice Chair 
FMCB Members FMCB Member 
FMCB Members             FMCB Member 
Mass. Dept of Trans             Secretary of Transportation 
   
MBTA Senior Leadership             General Manager 
MBTA Senior Leadership Deputy General Manager 
MBTA Senior Leadership Chief of Staff (GM) 
MBTA Senior Leadership Chief of Operations Strategy, Policy & 
Oversight 
MBTA Senior Leadership Chief Railroad Officer 
MBTA Senior Leadership Chief Safety Officer 
MBTA Senior Leadership Green Line Extension Program Manager 
MBTA Senior Leadership Executive Director of Commuter Rail 
MBTA Senior Leadership Chief of Staff (DGM) 
MBTA Senior Leadership Chief Operations Officer 
MBTA Senior Leadership Chief Counsel 
MBTA Senior Leadership Assistant GM - Capital Delivery 
MBTA Senior Leadership Chief Customer Officer 
MBTA Senior Leadership AGM for Strategic Initiatives 
MBTA Senior Leadership  Chief of Capital Programs 
MBTA Senior Leadership Assistant General Manager for Policy  
MBTA Senior Leadership Chief Administration Officer 
MBTA Senior Leadership  Chief of Green Line Transformation 
MBTA Senior Leadership Director, Communications and Public 
Affairs 
MBTA Senior Leadership   Chief Environmental. Health & Safety 
Officer 
MBTA Senior Leadership AGM - C/R and Ferry Ops, RR Operations 
MBTA Senior Leadership Chief Human Resource Officer 
MBTA Senior Leadership Chief Engineering Officer 
MBTA Senior Leadership Project Manager, South Coast Rail 
MBTA Senior Leadership Dep Dir of Policy & Strategic Planning 
MBTA Senior Leadership Chief Information Officer 
   
MBTA Management Deputy Director of Commuter Rail Safety 
MBTA Management Director of Asset Management 
MBTA Management Deputy CFO 
MBTA Management Director of Risk Management 
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MBTA Management Sr. Director of E&M 
MBTA Management Chief Mechanical Officer 
MBTA Management Director - Maintenance of Way 
MBTA Management AGM of Rail Operations 
MBTA Management Deputy Director MOW 
MBTA Management Director of Signals and Communications 
MBTA Management Dep Dir. of Safety Engineering - 
Infrastructure 
MBTA Management Dep Dir. of Safety Engineering -Systems 
MBTA Management Dep Dir. of Safety Oversight & Planning 
MBTA Management System Safety Specialist 
MBTA Management Safety Analyst 
MBTA Management Dep Dir. of Transportation Safety 
MBTA Management Safety Analyst 
MBTA Management System Safety Specialist 
MBTA Management Dep Dir. of Occupational Health & Safety 
MBTA Management Division Chief, Operations Control Center 
MBTA Management Deputy Director of Human Resources 
MBTA Management Dir Occupational Health Services 
MBTA Management Chief Procurement and Contract 
Administration Officer 
MBTA Management Director of Capital Execution Strategy 
MBTA Management Deputy AGM Capital Delivery 
MBTA Management Capital Program Oversight 
MBTA Management Director Railroad Operations  
MBTA Management Section Chief Railroad Operations 
MBTA Management Superintendent Subway Main Repair 
Facility 
MBTA Management  Deputy Directory, Heavy Rail Maintenance 
MBTA Management Superintendent of Light Rail Maintenance   
MBTA Management Superintendent Blue Line  
MBTA Management Technical Project Manager 
MBTA Management Deputy Director of Everett Shops  
MBTA Management Deputy Chief Mechanical Officer 
MBTA Management Engineer  
MBTA Management Technical Project Manager 
MBTA Management Deputy Director of Engineering 
  
Administrative Staff Manager of Staffing 
Administrative Staff Director of Labor Operations 
Administrative Staff Director of Parking 
Administrative Staff Deputy Director, Budget-Operating 
Administrative Staff Assistant Supervisor 
Administrative Staff Director of Realtime Applications 
Administrative Staff Senior Director of Real Estate 
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Administrative Staff Deputy Chief Real Estate Officer 
Administrative Staff Deputy Dir of Parking Operations 
Administrative Staff Senior Labor Counsel 
Administrative Staff Labor Counsel 
Administrative Staff Director of Accounting 
Administrative Staff Budget Analyst 
Administrative Staff HR Manager, Special Projects 
Administrative Staff Director of Inventory Management 
  
Supervision Supervisor of Transportation 
Supervision Supervisor of Transportation 
Supervision Blue Line Signal Supervisor 
Supervision Red Line Track Supervisor 
Supervision Supervisor- Power Systems & Equipment 
Supervision Supervisor – Building Trades 
Supervision Supervisor, Ops Control Center 
Supervision Chief Inspector Green Line 
Supervision Heavy Rail Dispatcher OCC 
Supervision Light Rail Dispatcher OCC 
Supervision Yard Master Orange Line      
Supervision Senior Director - Warehouse & Inventory 
Management 
  
Frontline Employee Motor person Blue Line  
Frontline Employee Inspector Orange Line 
Frontline Employee Streetcar Motor person Green Line 
Frontline Employee Train Starter Orange Line    
Frontline Employee Motor person Orange Line 
Frontline Employee Inspector Orange Line 
Frontline Employee Streetcar Motor person Green Line 
Frontline Employee Inspector Green Line  
Frontline Employee Customer Service Agent Orange Line 
Frontline Employee Train Starter Orange Line 
Frontline Employee Desk Starter Green Line 
Frontline Employee Track Person (inspector) 
Frontline Employee Track Person (inspector) 
Frontline Employee Motor-person  
Frontline Employee Motor-person  
   
Union Leadership  
Local 589 Riverside Car House (Local 589 Barn 
Captain) 
Local 589 Cabot Car House (Local 589 Barn Captain) 
Local 589 Wellington Car House (Local 589 Barn 
Captain) 
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Local 589 Maintenance of Way Green Line (Local 589 
Barn Captain) 
Local 246 Local 246 Representative 
Local 246 Local 246 Representative 
Local 246 Local 103 Representative 
Local 103 Local 103 Representative 
Local 103 Local 103 Representative 
Local 104 Foreman day construction - Local 104 
Local 104 Sub-station Steward - Local 104 
Local 104 Emergency Crew Steward - Local 104 
   
LTK   
LTK Representative Vice President 
LTK Representative Deputy PTC Program Manager 
LTK Representative PTC Systems Engineer 
LTK Representative Senior Engineer - PTC Safety 
LTK Representative Senior Consultant 
  
Keolis  
Keolis Management General Manager 
Keolis Management Locomotive Engineer 
Keolis Management Dir. of Occupational Safety 
Keolis Management Vice President, Safety and Security 
  
DPU  
DPU Representative Director of Transportation Oversight 
Division 
DPU Representative Assistant Director of Transportation 
Oversight Division 
  
FTA  
FTA Representative Acting Regional Administrator for Region 1 
Office 
FTA Representative Director Office of Program Management and 
Oversight  
FTA Representative Deputy Associate Administrator Office of 
Transit Safety and Oversight 
  
FRA  
FRA Representative FRA Regional Administrator, Region 1 
  
Network Rail  
NR Representative Associate Vice President 
NR Representative Regional Director, North America 
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HNTB  
HNTB Representative Project Manager 
HNTB Representative Project Manager 
  
CRRC  
CRRC Representative Interim PM 
CRRC Representative System Integration and Test Engineer 
  
STV Inc  
STV Representative Vice President 
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Appendix D 
 
Focus Group Commentary 
 
Six focus groups were arranged by their various levels within the organization.  In addition, 
back office support functions (Human Resources, Legal, Procurement, Real Estate, Finance, 
Information Technology, etc.) were in separate groups from employees in operating functions. The 
make-up of the groups was as follows: 
 
• Transportation/Operations – 3 groups (1 group of supervisors, 2 groups of blended frontline 
supervisors and hourly employees) 
• Support Functions – 2 groups (Human Resources, Legal, Procurement, Real Estate, Finance, 
Information Technology, etc.) 
• Union representatives  – 1 group 
 
Each session was 90 minutes in length and had 3 basic rules of conduct.  First, what is said in 
this room, stays in the room.  Second, one person speaks at a time, and third, each participant was 
asked to speak from his/her own perspective.  Three to four general questions were asked at each 
session, as follows: 
 
• How do you perceive the T views Safety?  Provide a grade of  “A” through “F” and please 
provide a reason for the grade you give. 
• If culture is defined as “How we do things around here”, what does leadership need to do more 
of, or less of, to build and sustain a healthy organizational culture? 
• If the term “engagement” is defined as being actively involved in and dedicated to ones work 
and the organization.  Engaged employees are excited to be a part of it.  They are willing to go 
above and beyond to help the organization succeed. How would you describe your level of 
engagement with the agency? 1 being least engaged—5 being highly engaged. Please explain 
your answer. 
• If you had 1 wish and you can tell leadership what you would like them to do differently  – 
what would it be? 
 
How employees perceive Safety? 
 
• Everything is reactive.  
• A well-trained employee is a safer employee.  The T can’t get people trained because jobs have 
to be covered, but we don’t have the people needed to do the work. 
• Safety is a joke.  We take it more seriously because it is our lives. 
• Culture at MBTA? Safety is another disappointment.  We walk the track—we walk with our 
heads down. 
• I stopped calling Safety—after the third time I gave up.  Now I just go to the customer and tell 
them to tweet the situation and it gets done.  They listen to the customer before their own 
employees. 
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Blame and Retaliation 
 
• The culture is always finding a scapegoat—Who is to Blame? 
• I walk on eggshells—lack of trust.  I am not even sure who to trust. 
• Bring something up—they retaliate.  
• Look at our equipment, trains, tracks—they know all about what’s wrong—until it happens to 
a customer—then they blame whoever is around. 
 
Perception of Leadership  
 
• Important to make connection with people. The top leaders on down are too busy. 
• There is always room for improvement. Well intentioned—its perception. A lot of GM 
changes. Nothing about safety from the FMCB. All they think about is fiscal. 
• More folks in leadership need to go out and make people feel included. 
• Management created a culture when you ask a question they say, “just do what we say”. 
• I came here wanting to do a good job. There is no good communication—total reactionary. 
Everything is after the fact—there is no insight. 
• Newbies are “good idea boys”. But nothing gets done.  They need to talk to people (in the 
field) and leave their cube. 
• Bringing new people in—putting them in harm’s way because they are not experienced. 
 
Teamwork 
 
• Silos—there is a lack of clarity on who does what. Makes it hard to hold anyone accountable. 
• Silos makes everything take longer and harder to do. Surprised—working here for 2 years and 
I just learned about a missed opportunity sitting here in this focus group. 
• Need to be more of a team rather than pitting us against each other; or everyone should just 
share information. 
• The culture struggles with who is the internal customer. There are siloes within departments. 
There is not a level of cooperation among departments. 
 
Internal Communications 
 
• Onboarding? I was shocked. Just got my badge and benefits. T drops the ball on giving good 
info about the organization and culture. 
• Even my department.  No information about responsibility—authority level—no clue. Had to 
figure it out.  We call ourselves CSI. 
• First year was tough—real lack of a welcome. Thirteen years later—there have been ebbs and 
waves. I’m on a wave right now. 
• Communications needs to come from the top down. There is no newsletter. What are the good 
things we are doing?—share the big wins. Instead we get, “Well that’s how we always did it.” 
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Managerial Communications 
 
• Managers—some are good—some are not. They don’t know how to convey a message and 
handle stress. 
• I’ve been here for years. The place is different. When I am on the clock I own this place. The 
public is my boss.  I wish I could brag about the T. I do not want to move up.  I make more 
than my supervisor with overtime. 
• It’s not attractive to advance to management—you get a pay cut and they beat you up all day. 
• Budget cut issues causes lack of manpower.  We are more reactive and need to be more 
proactive. Why bother to call it in—nothing is going to happen. They are afraid of elevating 
issues. 
• They don’t treat people respectfully. 
• Employees are treated as guilty until proven innocent. 
• Need to work from the bottom up, not the top down. My boss says—“I was directed to do this” 
Why? Management needs to get input from the boots on the ground. 
• They don’t consider that you are on the frontline. They forgot where they came from. Sitting 
in their car during the winter.  Why don’t they grab a shovel! 
• They are not trained to listen. They need to be trained on how to give orders. They bring 
everyone down. 
 
 
